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In pursuit of the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the 
National Military Strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces require access to military and logistics 
facilities overseas to be able to support and sustain its combat power projection.  Access 
to these places translates into capabilities.  Therefore, forward presence has a deterrent 
value even in a potential conflict scenario where the United States policy is one of 
“strategic ambiguity,” e.g., as in a Taiwan-PRC military confrontation.  An American 
military forward presence in time of peace as well as in heightened regional tensions 
lends credibility to U.S. diplomacy.  Moreover, access to forward locations is expedient 
when engaging transnational threats or supporting humanitarian missions, e.g., the South 
and Southeast Asia tsunami relief operations.   
This thesis analyzes the political opposition to U.S. military presence in Thailand 
and the Philippines.  The historical context that led to the development of this opposition 
is examined in detail to identify the domestic sources of disagreement with the United 
States military presence, or policies on access to base facilities.  The rationale of those 
who oppose, as well as those who support, U.S. presence are clearly delineated.  By 
understanding the sensitive political issues, American military planners and operators can 
adapt basing and access strategies according to the political climate in these two 
countries.  The politics unique to each environment will dictate the combination of “pure” 
basing strategies tailored to meet the U.S. military objectives, as well as the public 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. IMPORTANCE 
In pursuit of the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the 
National Military Strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces require access to military and logistics 
facilities overseas to be able to support and sustain its combat power projection.  Access 
to these places translates into capabilities.  Therefore, forward presence has a deterrent 
value even in a potential conflict scenario where the United States policy is one of 
“strategic ambiguity,” e.g., as in a Taiwan-PRC military confrontation.  An American 
military forward presence in time of peace or in a regional crisis lends credibility to U.S. 
diplomacy and may actually prevent armed hostilities.  Moreover, access to forward 
locations is expedient when engaging transnational threats or supporting humanitarian 
missions, e.g., the tsunami relief operations.1
Purpose:  
This thesis analyzes the political opposition to the American military forward 
presence in Thailand and the Philippines as its dependent variable.  It examines the 
historical context that led to the development of the opposition.  The study focuses on the 
domestic sources (independent variable) of disagreement with the United States military 
presence, or policies on access to base facilities.  For reasons of comparison, this study 
begins in the 1980s.  This period presents an opportunity to compare the domestic 
opposition in Thailand after American bases closed in 1976 to that in the Philippines in 
which the U.S. military bases remained in the 1980s until their closure in 1992.  The 
presence of American military bases in the past was perceived to have had an impact on 
domestic security and democracy.  Security and democracy have an inverse relationship 
with the political opposition to American forward presence.   If the U.S. military presence 
is  perceived  as  contributing to security and democracy, there tends to be less opposition  
 
1 Admiral Thomas B. Fargo thanked the Thai government for allowing the U.S. military to use Utapao 
airbase in the country’s Chonburi province to support the regional tsunami relief efforts.  Source:  “US 
PACIFIC FORCES CHIEF APPLAUDS THAILAND FOR TSUNAMI OPERATIONS,” 20 January 2005, 
Thai Press Reports, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 01/31/05) 
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to an American military presence.  Inversely, if the United States military access is 
perceived as compromising security2 and democracy,3 the opposition becomes more 
assertive.   
The presence of U.S. military bases in Thailand and the Philippines during the 
periods of military or authoritarian regimes shaped the perceptions that associated the 
American presence with the degradation of democracy.  For the Filipinos, the legacy of 
American colonialism created nationalistic tendencies that view the continued presence 
of foreign military forces as inimical to national sovereignty.  This perception was shared 
across the political spectrum in the 1980s, and not just on the political left.   
In contrast, Thailand was not a colony of the United States and did not share the 
propensity for anti-American sentiments across a broad political spectrum.  Instead, Thai 
national identity was shaped by the threats of incursion across the surrounding borders, 
either by imperialist and colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries like the British, 
French, and the Japanese or by communist forces from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam 
during the height of the Cold War.  Right-wing Thai nationalism focused on the nature of 
“Thainess” that placed emphasis on the “monarchy, religion, and the nation.”4  During 
the democratic transition of 1973, the political left in Thailand was viewed by the right-
wing groups as composed of infiltrators and agitators linked to the external threat of 
 
2 According to P.H. Liotta, “Vital interests assure a state of its security, the defense of its freedom and 
independence, protection of its institutions, and enshrinement of its values.”  Source:  P.H. Liotta, “Still 
worth dying for national interests and the nature of strategy,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, 
from the internet:  http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_56/ai_101614291/pg_3  
(accessed 01/11/05).  Liotta cited Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, (Chicago, 
IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1962), 191 
3 Democracy as defined by Robert Dahl is a process of governing an association by having met at least 
five criteria: (1) effective participation, (2) voting equality, (3) opportunities for enlightened understanding, 
(4) final control of agenda, and (5) inclusive citizenship.  Source:  Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale 
University Press (1998), 37, from the internet: 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Democracy/On_Democracy_Dahl.html  (accessed 12/24/04) 
4 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons:  Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World 
(London and New York:  Verso, 1998), 142.  See Katherine A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty:  An 
Anthropology of the State and the Village Scout Movement (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1997), 
20.  See also Marjorie A. Muecke, “The Village Scouts of Thailand,” Asian Survey 20, No.4 (April 1980), 
422.  These sources identified the counter-insurgency experts and the right-wing movement’s manipulation 
of nationalistic symbols that revolved around the monarchy, religion and the nation to challenge the 
iconoclasm of the Left.  The insouciance of the young leftist students in questioning the traditional 
interpretation of Thai history was viewed by the rightists as a sign of disrespect towards the monarchy and 
religion. 
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communism.5 Hence, the leftist-organized anti-American (military bases) demonstrations 
were violently attacked by right-wing groups which included the Nawaphon, the Red 
Gaurs and the Village Scouts.6   
The Village Scouts was a civilian organization formed by the Thai Border Police 
to counter the spread of communist influence in the rural areas.7  The Border Police had 
been an active component of the counter-insurgency program in the 1970s.  The United 
States supported and financed the Thai Border Police in the early 1950s through the 
1960s as part of the containment strategy against the spread of communism in Southeast 
Asia.8  Right-wing groups in Thailand viewed the United States as an ally against the 
threat of communism, especially in the 1970s at the height of the Vietnam War.  Hence, 
the rightist movement advocated the continued presence of the American forces and 
military bases in Thailand during this period.9
The main points of criticism on democracy issues arose from the American 
support of the military regimes in Thailand and President Marcos’ authoritarian regime in 
the Philippines.  Other arguments against the American presence involve perceived threat 
to sovereignty and security.  For these reasons, opponents of U.S. military access or 
deployment in Thailand and the Philippines will most likely attempt to perpetuate the 
perceptions or “myths” created as a result of the negative aspects of the past American 
presence.  Charges of “neo-colonialism” are common in current discourse of the 
Philippine left, as they were in Thailand in the 1970s.   
Thailand and the Philippines were recently designated by Washington as “major 
non-NATO allies.” The U.S. military faces the possibility of future access or forward 
 
5 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped:  A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu:  
University of Hawai’i Press, 1994), 169-170.  He stated, “…one of the most persistent strategies of the 
counterinsurgency is to link socialists, communists, and the Left with the external threat.” (170) 
6 Bowie, 105-106 
7 Ibid., 2-3 
8 Daniel Fineman, A special relationship:  the United States and military government in Thailand, 
1947-1958, (Honolulu, HI:  University of Hawaii Press, 1997).  See Bowie, 74-76.  Beginning in 1965 and 
four years afterwards, 47 percent of all United States Operation Mission (USOM) aid to Thailand was 
given to the Thai National Police Department.   
9 “At a demonstration by thirty thousand people on March 21, 1976, to demand the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Thailand grenades and plastic bombs were thrown into the crowd.  Four people were killed and 
85 injured.  Red Gaurs [right-wing group of vigilantes] were seen in the area at the time of the bombing.”  
Source:  Bowie, 106.  See David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand 
(Cambridge, MA:  Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), 167 
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deployments in these countries during a period of regional crisis.  Furthermore, the 
United States military conducts regular training exercises with both countries.  The 
potential impact of the American presence on the security and democracy in these 
countries will shape the debate about the issue of access in the years to come.  The 
concepts of security and democracy will have different interpretations dictated by the 
competing interests of opposing groups within these countries.  These groups may 
include left-wing and the right-wing nationalists, the Muslim minorities, and members of 
mainstream civil society and political parties.   
Before dealing with the controversies of Thai and Philippine interests, it is best to 
first understand the need for American military forward access to overseas facilities.  The 
U.S. rationale is rooted in national interests that are both implied and articulated by the 
National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. 
 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS) AND NATIONAL MILITARY 
STRATEGY (NMS) OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
“The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American 
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”10  
Among the goals enunciated in the NSS are “political and economic freedom, peaceful 
relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”11  The NSS laid down a list of 
tasks to achieve these goals.  They include (1) championing the aspirations for human 
dignity, (2) strengthening of alliances to defeat global terrorism, (3) working with others 
to defuse regional conflicts, (4) the prevention of our enemies from threatening us and 
our allies with weapons of mass destruction, (5) promotion of global economic growth 
through free markets and free trade, (6) the expansion of open societies and democracies, 
(7) cooperative action with other main centers of global power, and (8) the transformation 
of America’s national security institutions.12  The NSS established the overarching 
defense objectives that are supported by the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS).  The 
NDS in turn gives the strategic direction to the National Military Strategy (NMS).  One 
 
10 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 1-2  
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of the four NDS objectives that guide the NMS is, “Secure strategic access and retain 
global freedom of action.”13  The NMS stated its three supporting military objectives as 
follows:  “to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent 
conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”14  The ability of the 
U.S. military to gain access to military and logistic facilities in Southeast Asia will 
facilitate the achievement of these NSS goals and NDS/NMS objectives. 
America’s desire to build a consensus in the Asia-Pacific region against the 
scourge of terrorism involves a comprehensive approach to alliances.  This alliance not 
only include traditional allies in Asia, but also the other major players in the region, viz., 
China and Russia, as evidenced by the counter-terrorism security measures endorsed by 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Chile recently.15   
Free trade and the free market is one of the hallmarks of American policy in 
promoting global economic growth.  China and Japan are among the top trade partners of 
the United States with 12.5 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively, of estimated total 
American imports in 2003.16  Japan is one of the major export partners of the United 
States with 7.2 percent of estimated total American exports in 2003.17 According to Eng 
Chuan Ong, “The Asia-Pacific region already accounts for almost 50 percent of world 
trade and for more than 50 percent of the world's economic output.  East Asia accounts 
for approximately one-third of U.S. trade, broadly comparable to U.S. NAFTA partners, 
and exceeds Western Europe's share.”18  It is therefore in the national interest of the 
United States to maintain regional stability in Northeast and Southeast Asia.  An 
American forward military presence and temporary deployment capabilities has a role in 
preventing conflicts and deterring aggression in the region.   
 
13 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 1 
14 Ibid., 8. Bold in the original.  
15 “APEC leaders pledge security boost,” CNN.com, posted 21 November 2004, from the internet:  
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/11/21/apec.wrap.ap/index.html (accessed 11/21/04) 
16 CIA World Factbook, from the internet:  
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Econ (accessed 11/21/04) 
17 Ibid. 
18 Eng Chuan Ong, “Anchor East Asian Free Trade in ASEAN,” The Washington Quarterly, 26.2 
(2003), 57-72.  From Project Muse:  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.2ong.html 
(accessed 11/21/04) 
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Moreover, the operational concepts of the military’s Joint Vision 2020 include 
“dominant maneuver,” “precision engagement,” and “focused logistics.”19  To employ 
these concepts, the U.S. Armed Forces will need access to overseas bases and facilities to 
mass its forces, deliver precision strikes against the opponent, and sustain these 
operations with logistics “at the right place and at the right time.”20  The recent 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq required the transport of equipment, personnel and 
supplies at long distances.  Moving these forces from the Atlantic seaboard via the 
European bases to Southwest Asia was one of the mobility options.  In addition, the 
availability of an alternate route from the Pacific west coast via Southeast Asia logistics 
facilities or “lily pads” could maximize the speed and the agility to mass American 
combat power.  Access to forward logistics bases in Thailand and the Philippines will 
help project and sustain U.S. forces in the event of another Middle East crisis. 
 
C. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM) THEATER SECURITY 
CONCERNS 
 
In a speech to the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS) Biennial 
Conference on 16 June 2004, Admiral Thomas Fargo (Commander, USPACOM) 
identified the major regional security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, as follows: (1) 
conflict in the Korean Peninsula, (2) miscalculation resulting in a conflict between India 
and Pakistan or in the Taiwan Straits, (3) Southeast Asia and transnational threats, 
including terrorism, piracy, illegal drug trade, trafficking in humans, and diseases like 
SARs, AIDS, and avian flu.21   
The tensions resulting from the lull in the six-party talks involving South Korea, 
Japan, China, Russia, North Korea and the United States was viewed by the USPACOM 
commander with great concern.  The North Koreans have about one million active-duty 
troops, six to seven million reservists, and chemical weapons according to Admiral 
Fargo.22  Admiral Fargo reiterated the importance of the peaceful solution to the 
 
19 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, June 2000, Washington, DC:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office 
20 Ibid., 24 
21 Thomas Fargo, speech given to the Asia-Pacific Center of Strategic Studies (APCSS), 16 June 2004, 
from the internet:  http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040616apcss.shtml (11/21/04)   
22 Fargo, speech given to the Asia-Pacific Center, 16 June 2004 
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complete and permanent elimination of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula.  A 
potential India-Pakistani conflict is similarly clouded by the prospect of a nuclear 
exchange.  India and Pakistan came close to war because of increased tensions in 2002.  
A nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent would have unimaginable consequences in 
humanitarian terms.   
Admiral Fargo was also concerned about a miscalculation in the Taiwan Straits 
and its destabilizing effect on the whole region.  The United States adopted a policy 
supporting the peaceful solution of the Taiwan question that is free from the threat or use 
of armed force.  President Bush reiterated the American opposition to a unilateral action 
by either party (China or Taiwan) to change the status quo across the Taiwan Straits.  The 
United States supports a “one China” policy and the three communiqués.23  In addition, 
the United States is also committed in fulfilling its obligations under the Taiwan 
Relations Act.24  China has embarked on a program of military modernization that is 
altering the balance of forces across the Taiwan Straits.  Even though the United States 
has chosen a military posture of “strategic ambiguity” in the case of a Taiwan crisis, it 
bodes well to have the capabilities to support whatever options America may adopt.  One 
can be ambiguous in intent but also have a credible diplomatic weight by having the 
capability to project and sustain military power in the region.  Access to forward 
locations and facilities in Thailand and the Philippines reinforces the hand of diplomacy. 
Southeast Asia is also the location of the Straits of Malacca, an important oil route 
between the Middle East and Asia. The presence of transnational threats like terrorism, 
illegal drug trade, piracy, and epidemic diseases are a concern to the USPACOM because 
of their inimical effects on the stability of the region.  The activities of the Al-Qaeda-
linked Jemaah Islamiyah across Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
 
23 The three Joint Communiqués of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China 
were signed in 1972, 1979, and 1982 respectively.  The 1972 document established normal relations 
between the two states.  It was followed by the second communiqué establishing diplomatic relations in 
1979.  The 1982 joint communiqué reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to a peaceful solution to 
the Taiwan question.  See Muthiah Alagappa, Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-
Straits Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY:  M.E. Sharpe, 2001), Appendix covering the 
three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.  See also U.S. Department of State, International 
Information Programs for posted e-copies of the Three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, 
from the internet:  http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/east_asia_pacific/china/china_communiques.html (accessed 
02/25/04) 
24 Ibid.,  See also Admiral Fargo, speech at the APCSS, 16 June 2004 
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highlighted the importance of these countries in the War on Terrorism.  The spread of 
diseases like SARs, AIDS, and avian flu have deleterious consequences to the Southeast 
Asian economies because of the additional demands on their limited resources.  The 
recent tsunami catastrophe in South and Southeast Asia demonstrated the critical 
importance of the ability to gain access to forward operating bases in Thailand.25   
Forward facilities and bases allows the United States not only to project combat 
capabilities, but also to conduct humanitarian missions and “military operations other 
than war” (MOOTW). 
 
D. RAND “PURE” BASING STRATEGIES 
 
This thesis focuses on the political issues inherent in the forward deployment of 
American military forces in Thailand and the Philippines.  By understanding the political 
issues, U.S. military planners and operators can adapt the basing and access strategies 
according to the existing political milieu in these two countries.  The politics unique to 
each environment will dictate the combination of “pure” basing strategies tailored to meet 
the U.S. military objectives and the public diplomacy required to support them.26
The RAND Corporation undertook a study under the Project AIR FORCE that 
was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations (AF/XO) that 
sought to “…examine the political, operational, logistical, and force protection issues 
associated with overseas basing for the Expeditionary Aerospace Force.”27  The RAND 
report entitled A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force explores the “pure” basing 
and access strategies.28  The study covered several issues and variables that may affect 
other countries’ decision to grant or deny access to the U.S. military.  The RAND report 
distinguished three kinds of access, viz., (1) permanent presence, (2) mission presence, 
 
25 “Bush pledges U.S. assistance to tsunami survivors,” Global News Wire, 29 December 2004, from 
Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 01/02/05) 
26 The United States Information Agency defines Public Diplomacy as, “Public diplomacy seeks to 
promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, 
informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and 
institutions and their counterparts abroad.”  Source:  Public Diplomacy Web Site, sponsored by the United 
States Information Agency Alumni Association, from the internet:  http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm 
(accessed 01/31/05) 
27 David A. Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-Paley, A Global Access Strategy 
for the U.S. Air Force,(Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2002), iii 
28 Shlapak and others, eds., A Global Access Strategy 
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and (3) limited access.  “Permanent presence” is defined by the authors as, “The presence 
of U.S. forces abroad, in bases or facilities that are operated by the United States either 
alone or in concert with host countries...”29  American bases in NATO countries, Japan, 
Korea, and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba are examples of this kind of basing arrangement.   
“Mission presence” was described as substantial presence in countries for the 
purpose of an ongoing military mission where there may or may not be treaty 
commitments.30   
“Limited access” is the arrangement “...where the United States maintains no 
forces on a regular basis but where its troops visit on occasion to assist in training, for 
exercises, or to take part in contingency operations.”31  U.S. military presence in 
Thailand and the Philippines fits the description of “limited access.”  Future access to 
bases in Thailand and the Philippines is not definite because of domestic political reasons 
and sensitivities to the presence of foreign troops.  The purpose of the American military 
operations and its potential effect on the host nation’s relationship with third parties could 
affect the approval of access to base facilities.  American humanitarian missions staged 
from these countries are less likely to be politicized.  As a result, there may be minimal or 
no domestic political agitation against MOOTW, “Non-Combatant Evacuation 
Operations” (NEO), or humanitarian relief missions.  
The RAND report identified five alternative “pure” basing strategies: 
(1) Expansion of the number of overseas main operating bases (MOBs) to 
increase the likelihood of military presence in these areas. 
 
(2) Identifying one or more “reliable” allies in each region of the world and 
relying on them for future cooperation. 
 
(3) Proliferation of security agreements and alliances to broaden potential 
partners in any given contingency. 
 
(4) Securing long-term extraterritorial access to bases, as in Diego Garcia. 
 
 




                                                
(5)  Relying on extended-range operations from American territory, like 
Guam.32
 
These basing or access strategies are reviewed at the end of this thesis after taking 
the political environment in Thailand and the Philippines into consideration.  It is 
axiomatic that a modified or a combination of “pure” basing strategies may have to be 
adopted to fit the prevailing political and diplomatic climate.   
      
E. OPPOSITION TO U.S. MILITARY FORWARD ACCESS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND 
 
This thesis’s major question asks, what are the sources of opposition to American 
military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines?  It also explores the rationales 
of the opposition and the historical context which incubated these rationales. This thesis 
relies on the empirical evidence from books, journals, newspaper and magazine articles to 
document opposition to past American military presence in Thailand and the Philippines 
and to determine the current issues related to the prevailing contraposition to base access 
and forward deployment in both countries.  
As a result of this research, the thesis identifies the different sources and 
rationales of the opposition to the American military forward presence in Thailand and 
the Philippines.  Although there were some minor issues (environmental pollution and 
prostitution) cited by the opposition, the major rationales can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Loss of sovereignty. 
 
(2) Constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of foreign military forces 
and bases. 
 
(3) Negative effects on civil-military relations.  
 
(4) Jurisdiction issues over incidents involving American personnel.  
 
(5) Potential involvement in American conflicts with third parties or 
neighboring states. 
 
(6) Past American support of authoritarian or military regimes. 
 
 
32 Items 1-5 of the alternative “pure” basing strategies came from the RAND report, A Global Access 
Strategy for the U.S. Air Force.  Source: Shlapak and others, 92-93.   
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(7) Sensitivity of Muslim minorities to the American Global War on 
Terrorism that is perceived as anti-Islamic. 
 
(8) Government concern for the escalation of the Thai Muslim insurgency that 
may result from American forward deployments perceived to be related to 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  
  
The thesis shows the following reasons for supporting American military presence 
and access: 
(1) Defense against transnational and border threats, e.g., communist 
neighbors and international terrorism. 
 
(2) Improved internal defense against communist insurgencies and right-wing 
coups.33  
 
(3) Treaty obligations, viz., mutual defense agreement. 
 
(4) Military assistance and training received from the United States. 
 
(5) Economic benefits corollary to American military presence, e.g., creation 
of jobs and economic development aid. 
 
(6) Humanitarian or non-combatant nature of American access, e.g., disaster 
relief, transit refueling of cargo aircraft, Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operation (NEO), and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). 
 
Left-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines cited reasons (1) to (6), except (3), 
for opposing American military forward presence.  Right-wing nationalist groups in the 
Philippines in the 1980s share rationales (1), (2), & (5) as the political left.  Both Thai 
and Filipino Muslims voiced the sensitivities in point seven.  Thai left-wing groups cited 
rationales (1), (3), (5), & (6).  Members of the Thai academia, parliament, and the media 
share their government’s concern regarding the eighth and last point.  The six reasons for 
supporting U.S. military access or forward presence were cited by different groups and 
individuals in the government, the military, and the private sector in both Thailand and 
the Philippines. 
 
33 American F-4 PHANTOM jets flew missions from Clark Air Base as a symbol of support for the 
government of then President Corazon Aquino against the December 1989 attempted coup of right-wing 
forces within Philippine military.  Source:  “A close call for Aquino,” The Economist, 9 December 1989, 
from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/04/05) 
12 
F. ORGANIZATION   
 This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II reviews the colonial history of the Philippines under American rule and 
post-colonial nationalism and leftist mobilization in the 1960s-1970s.  This chapter also 
looks at the role of the Thai military in politics, and the impact of the Cold War on the 
U.S. military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. 
 Chapter III delves into which groups are against the U.S. military presence and 
how they developed from the 1980s to the present period.  In particular, three political 
camps are analyzed: leftist, right-wing, and the Muslim nationalist opposition.   
 Chapter IV explores the reasons why these groups are opposed to American 
military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines. 
 Chapter V summarizes the conclusions regarding the major sources of opposition 
to U.S. military presence in Thailand and the Philippines.  The designation of Thailand 
and the Philippines as major non-NATO allies (MNNA) reflects one of the “pure” basing 
strategies recommended by RAND.  The MNNA label brought speculation in Thailand 
and the Philippines of possible re-establishment of American military bases in the future.  
These speculations are contrary to the USPACOM emphasis on “places, not bases” which 
resulted from the political sensitivity to the presence of American “permanent bases” in 
the past.  In addition to RAND “pure” basing strategies (2) and (3) that fit the case of 
Thailand and the Philippines, the United States could expand non-military (civilian 
agencies, NGOs and law enforcement) relations to deal with counter-drugs, anti-piracy 
and counter-terrorism issues to avoid the sensitivities to a large American military 
footprint.  It would be difficult to achieve specific security agreements in both Thailand 
and the Philippines to fit every conceivable, contingency scenario.  Because of the 
controversial nature of American military presence and the inherent processes of debates 
or institutional checks and balances since the democratization in both Thailand and the 
Philippines, the Ad Hoc military deployments will remain dependant on the prevailing 
security interests of the potential host nation.  Permanent military basing is definitely out 
of the question at the present time sans a change in the security threat perceptions of these 
countries in relation to the other major powers in the region. 
13 
                                                
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF U.S.-PHILIPPINES AND          
U.S. -THAI RELATIONS34
The left-wing and right-wing nationalists in the Philippines criticized the 
American military presence and access to base facilities in their territory because it was a 
symbol of the colonial legacy and highlighted the “neocolonial”35 status of the Philippine 
relationship with the United States.  There are a variety of left-wing nationalist groups in 
the Philippines which include the communist-led National Democratic Front and the 
“reaffirmists” (pro-Sison) faction of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) on the far left, the “rejectionist” faction of the CPP which had splintered into 
numerous Marxist-Leninist parties and groups, the non-communist left composed of the 
social democrats and popular democrats, and independent center-left politicians who may 
belong to diverse political parties.  The right-wing movement in the Philippines remains 
latent in recent years, but it had been active politically in the 1980s in campaigning 
against the American military bases.36  Members of the Young Officers Union (YOU) 
were considered the most radical nationalist faction of these right-wing groups, which 
include the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the Marcos-loyalists’ 
 
34 The history of the United States relationship with Thailand and the Philippines had shaped the 
attitudes and outlook of left-wing and right-wing nationalists towards the American military forward 
presence in both countries.  Although the American colonial policies in the Philippines may have affected 
the development of Moro nationalism, the negative reaction of Filipino Muslims to American military 
presence has more to do with current United States policies related to the Middle East and the War on 
Terrorism.  Furthermore, the historical experience of Filipino Muslims with American colonial rule was not 
totally negative because Mindanao’s autonomy was preserved as it was administered separately by the U.S. 
Army from the rest of the Philippines through the cooptation of the Moro elites (Abinales, 3-6).  Abinales 
explored the rationale of local Muslim politicians who supported the American military presence on 
Basilan to assist the AFP in the suppression of the Abu Sayyaf.  Source:  Patricio Abinales, “American 
Military Presence in the Southern Philippines:  A Comparative Historical Review,” East-West Center 
Politics and Security Series, no. 7 (October 2004), from the internet:  
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PSwp007.pdf (accessed 02/12/05), 13-14 
The attitude of Muslims in southern Thailand was affected by current American policies in the Middle 
East and Prime Minister Thaksin’s decision to send Thai soldiers to Iraq in support of the post-conflict 
American occupation.  
35 According to Chalmers Johnson, “The characteristic institution of so-called neocolonialism is the 
multinational corporation covertly supported by an imperialist power.  This form of imperialism reduces 
the political costs and liabilities of colonialism by maintaining a façade of nominal political independence 
in the exploited country.”  Source:  Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire:  Militarism, Secrecy, and 
the End of the Republic (New York:  Metropolitan Books, 2004), 30 
36 Jose V. Abueva, comp., Kudeta:  The Challenge to Philippine Democracy, Philippine Center for 
Investigative Journalism, (Manila:  Recon Printing Press, 1990) 
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Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP).37  The RAM changed its name in the early 1990s to 
Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM) or Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance.  
Anti-American nationalism in the Philippines is certainly not the purview solely of the 
political left.  Although the rightists’ movement is politically latent, certain quarters in 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines occasionally echo the right-wing nationalists’ 
resentment of American military presence - especially the involvement of American 
Special Forces personnel in the recent counter-terrorism exercises in the southern 
Philippines.38
While Thailand was never a colony of the United States, the large presence of 
U.S. armed forces in the 1970s was interpreted by the political left during those times as a 
violation of the sovereignty of the country.39  The withdrawal of the American bases 
from Thailand was one of the top campaign issues of the leading left-wing student 
organization, the National Student Center of Thailand, during the short period of 
democratic space between 1973 and 1976.40  In addition to the left-wing movement in 
academia, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) used political, economic, cultural and 
military themes linked to the American presence to spread the claim of American 
colonialism or neocolonialism in Thailand.41   
 
37 Abueva, Kudeta, 133-137 
38 “Maj. Gen. Raul Relano, commanding general of the [Philippine] Army’s 6th ID, admitted that 
some of his officers have raised the issue of “sovereignty" over the Americans’ presence. At one point, 
Relano said, some officers confronted the Americans themselves about whether they had “written" 
authority to stay in camp, only to be told in vague terms they got their clearance to stay in 6th ID from 
Camp Aguinaldo, the main headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).”  Source:  Aries 
Rufo, “Unwanted Presence?” Newsbreak online edition (February 2005), from the internet:  
http://partners.inq7.net/newsbreak/istories/index.php?story_id=21716 (accessed 02/03/05) 
39 “The post-October 14 [1973] civilian governments were apparently unable to resist the increasingly 
strong pressure for the U.S. withdrawal. For example, Siang Puang Chon (Voice of the People), urged the 
Seni government that the U.S. presence meant the loss of Thailand’s sovereignty and honor as well as 
future damage to the country and its neighbors... The daily went on to encourage the NTSC to carry on 
their fight against the presence of U.S. bases in Thailand.”  Source:  Puangthong Rungswasdisab, 
“Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide,” Genocides Studies Program, Yale University, from the 
internet:  http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/ThailandResponse.html (accessed 02/03/05) 
40 Ibid. 
41 Stephen I. Alpern, “Insurgency in the Northeast of Thailand:  A New Cause for Alarm,” Asian 
Survey 15, no. 8 (1975), 687.  According to Chalmers Johnson, “…neocolonial domination need not be 
economic.  It can be based on a kind of international protection racket – mutual defense treaties, military 
advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to ‘defend’ against often poorly defined, 
overblown, or nonexistent threats.”  Source: Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, 31 
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Understanding the history of Philippine-American and Thai-American relations 
will clarify the sources of the perceptions that shape the opposition to American military 
presence in these countries. 
 
A. AMERICAN COLONIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE    
POST-INDEPENDENCE “SPECIAL” PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Perhaps it is ironic, from the perspective of present-day Filipino opposition to the 
U.S. military forward presence, that the American quest for a colony in Asia in the late 
19th century was spurred by a desire to have access to a strategic military and commercial 
post to establish trade with mainland China and the rest of Asia.  The Philippines is at the 
crossroads of commerce and navigation that linked Northeast and Southeast Asia.  
America’s declaration of war against Spain in 1898 was fortuitous in a historical sense 
because the latter was the colonial power occupying the Philippine Islands at that time.  
As the confluence of events turned out, the United States was also an emerging industrial 
and military power in search of a role in the international system dominated by the 
imperialist and colonial powers like England and France.  For the American supporters of 
the war with Spain, nothing was more convenient than to have a “splendid little war” to 
depose the floundering Spanish stranglehold over colonies in the Caribbean and the Asia-
Pacific.  The most influential American anti-imperialist, Mark Twain, supported the 
Spanish-American war in the belief that it was for the purpose of freeing the colonies 
from Spanish oppression.42  Mark Twain was appalled to learn the contents of the Treaty 
of Paris, which gave the United States control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the 
Philippines.43  Spain received twenty million dollars from America in exchange for the 
Philippines.44  The United States had arrived at the international arena of great power 
 
42 Mark Twain, Mark Twain’s Weapons of Satire:  Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-
American War, ed. Jim Zwick (Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1992), xix-xx 
43 Ibid. 
44 Library of Congress, “Treaty of Paris 1898,” (8/14/98), from the internet:  
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/treaty.html (accessed 02/03/05) 
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politics urged by the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power doctrine and President 
William McKinley’s “Manifest Destiny.”45   
Before the United States entered the scene in 1898, the Philippines crossed the 
Rubicon of self-determination after more than three hundred years under the colonial rule 
of Spain.  Filipinos rose in revolt against Spain in 1896 after the frustration with the 
earlier attempts of the Philippine Reform Movement to gain gradual political changes and 
representation in the Spanish Cortez.46  The first phase of the Philippine revolution 
spread from the outskirts of Manila across the island of Luzon after the secret society of 
the Katipunan was discovered by the Spanish authorities.47  According to Filipino 
historian Teodoro Agoncillo, “… before the outbreak of the revolution, the Katipunan in 
Cavite was already divided into two factions representing two provincial councils.”48  
The two camps were known as the Magdalo and the Magdiwang factions.  The rivalry of 
these groups led to a series of reversals in the revolution’s progress in the province of 
Cavite in early January 1897.49  Leaders of the Magdiwang faction invited the leader of 
the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, to mediate between the two camps to resolve the 
disputes.  The Magdalo faction argued that since the revolution had already broken out 
 
45 Alfred Thayer Mahan is a U.S. naval officer and historian well-known for his written work The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (published 1890) whose main thesis stated that a nation 
which controlled the sea lanes of commerce hold the decisive factor in modern warfare.  From the internet:  
http://www.bartleby.com/65/ma/Mahan-Al.html (accessed 01/14/05).  President William McKinley 
articulated the ideas of “Manifest Destiny” to rationalize the annexation of the Philippines as a colony.  
“Manifest Destiny” was the phrase used by American politicians in the 1840s to justify the continental 
expansion of the United States.  It gained religious and political overtones in later years by invoking the 
“mission” to spread the ideals of democracy, freedom and faith to rationalize imperialist expansion in the 
Philippines and the Caribbean.  From the internet:  http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/E/manifest/manifxx.ht 
(accessed 01/14/05) 
46There were several organizations that sought political reforms in the Philippine colony and in Spain.  
One of these is the Hispano-Filipino Association which among other things submitted a petition to the 
Spanish Cortes (parliament) to seek parliamentary representation for the Philippines.  The petition was 
ignored by the Cortes.  The association secured the passage of the compulsory teaching of Spanish and 
other laws related to judiciary reforms.  These reforms were never carried out after the reactionary group 
returned to power in Spain.  The other groups which played a role in the quest for reforms were the La Liga 
Filipina and members of the Masonic lodges in both Spain and the Philippines.  Both organizations 
supported the Propaganda Movement via the publication of La Solidaridad (The Solidarity).  Although the 
Masons were not directly responsible for the revolution, Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the revolutionary 
underground Katipunan, was a member of a Masonic lodge.  Source:  Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the 
Filipino People (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), 142-148 
47 Ibid., 170 
48 Ibid., 175 
49 Ibid, 176 See also Apolinario Mabini, “First Stage of the Revolution,” The Philippine Revolution, 
trans. Leon Ma. Guerrero (Philippines:  National Historical Commission, 1969), from the internet:  
http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/apsis/aufi/history/mabini2.htm (accessed 02/06/05) 
17 
                                                
and the Katipunan was no longer a secret society, the organization ought to be 
superseded by a new government.  Members of the Magdiwang faction “contended that 
the Katipunan should remain the government of the revolutionists because it already had 
a constitution and by-laws recognized by all.”50 Andres Bonifacio acceded to the 
demands of the Magdalo faction to reach a compromise.  Both groups agreed to meet and 
the Katipunan held an election at the Tejeros Convention in March 1897.51  The Tejeros 
elections did not end the factionalism within the Katipunan:   
At a convention held at Tejeros, the Katipunan's headquarters in March 
1897, delegates elected Aguinaldo president and demoted Bonifacio to the 
post of director of the interior. Bonifacio withdrew with his supporters and 
formed his own government. After fighting broke out between Bonifacio's 
and Aguinaldo's troops, Bonifacio was arrested, tried, and on May 10, 
1897, executed by order of Aguinaldo.52
The revolutionaries were demoralized by the execution of Bonifacio and suffered 
reverses during the rest of 1897, but the Spaniards also recognized the difficulties of 
completely defeating the insurgents in the battlefield.  The contending parties had 
reached a strategic stalemate and started armistice negotiations in August 1897.53  
Through intermediaries, the Spanish governor reached an agreement whereby he would 
pay Aguinaldo a sum equivalent to $800,000 if he and his government moved to Hong 
Kong in exile.54  This agreement would buy time for the Spanish governor to consolidate 
control of the colony.  For Aguinaldo and the revolutionary government, the money 
gained from the agreement would be used to purchase weapons and ammunition to 
continue the revolution.  Kratoska and Batson described the armistice, “This 
extraordinary agreement reveals the weakness of the Filipino forces, constantly harassed 
by the Spanish and unable to attract the backing of the landed Filipino elite, the 
principalia [class], whose wealth and control of manpower would have appreciably 
 
50Agoncillo, 177.  Andres Bonifacio was the founder and the recognized leader of the Katipunan.   
51 Mabini, Chapter VIII 
52 Library of Congress Country Studies, “The 1896 Uprising and Rizal’s Execution,”  Philippines – 
Country Study, from the internet:  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0022)  
(accessed 02/06/05) 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.  See also Paul Kratoska and Ben Batson, “Nationalism and Modernist Reform,” The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume Three, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambride, UK:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 256 
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strengthened the revolutionary cause.”55  The revolution went into a hiatus after General 
Emilio Aguinaldo signed the truce with the Spanish authorities in 1897.  He went into 
exile in Hong Kong on 27 December 1897.56   
Tensions between the United States and Spain arose after suspicions that the latter 
sabotaged the American ship, the USS Maine, which exploded while moored at the port 
of Havana, Cuba on 15 February 1898.57  Prior to this incident, there was already 
increasing Spanish uneasiness with the Republican League’s vote for the U.S. recognition 
of the Cuban insurgents who were fighting for independence from Spain.58   
When the United States declared war on Spain on 25 April 1898, the motion was 
set for the American support of the Filipino revolution against the Spanish colonial rule.  
Aguinaldo was transported back to the Philippines on an American steamer and he 
disembarked in Cavite province on 19 May.59  Admiral Dewey of the U.S. Navy 
provided 100 rifles to Aguinaldo and the American Consul in Hong Kong purchased 
another 2,000 rifles for the Philippine independence movement.60  Upon his arrival in the 
Philippines, General Aguinaldo consolidated his power and declared the Philippine 
independence on 12 June 1898.61  His pronouncement was modeled after the American 
declaration of independence.62  By June of 1898, the Filipino revolutionaries had virtual 
control of the whole island of Luzon with the exception of the port of Cavite and the city 
of Manila.63  On 23 June, Aguinaldo announced the formation of the Revolutionary 
Government, composed of an executive, congress and judiciary courts.64  A revolutionary 
congress was convened at Malolos (thirty-two kilometers north of Manila) on 15 
 
55 Kratoska and Batson, 256 
56 Agoncillio, 185 
57 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image:  America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York:  Random House, 
1989), 95 
58 Ibid. 




62 Library of Congress Country Studies, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris,” 
Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0024) (accessed 01/22/05) 
63 Agoncillo, 193 
64 Linn, 21 
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September 1898 for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for the new republic.65  The 
document was approved by the congress on 29 November 1898 and it was promulgated 
on 21 January 1899.66  Emilio Aguinaldo was proclaimed president of the republic two 
days after the promulgation of the constitution which was modeled after the constitutions 
of France, Belgium and the Latin American countries.67  According to Library of 
Congress researchers, the period of the first Philippine Republic was described as 
follows:  
American observers traveling in Luzon commented that the areas 
controlled by the republic seemed peaceful and well governed. The 
Malolos congress had set up schools, a military academy, and the Literary 
University of the Philippines. Government finances were organized, and 
new currency was issued. The army and navy were established on a 
regular basis, having regional commands. The accomplishments of the 
Filipino government, however, counted for little in the eyes of the great 
powers as the transfer of the islands from Spanish to United States rule 
was arranged in the closing months of 1898.68
The colonization of the Philippines was justified by President McKinley under the 
rubric of the “manifest destiny.”69  President McKinley stated in one of his interviews 
regarding the colonization of the Philippines, “…that we could not leave them [Filipinos] 
to themselves – they were unfit for self-government – and they would soon have anarchy 
and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was.”70   
The American annexation of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris after the 
existence of a duly constituted Philippine state elicited anger from the Filipinos.  A 
revolutionary Filipino general Antonio Luna quipped, “"people are not to be bought and 
sold like horses and houses.  If the aim [of the American Civil War] has been to abolish 
 
65 Library of Congress, “The Malolos Constitution” 
66 Ibid. 
67 Agoncillo, 206-209.  According to Agoncillo, “Owing to the objections of Mabini [Aguinaldo’s 
adviser] to some provisions of the constitution, Aguinaldo did not immediately promulgate it.”  See also 
Apolinario Mabini, “Development of the Revolution,” The Philippine Revolution, Chapter IX 
68 Library of Congress Country Studies, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris” 
69 Library of Congress, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris”  See footnote 14 for 
description of “Manifest Destiny”   
70 General James Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” The Christian Advocate 
[New York], January 22, 1903, 17.  Cited from Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds., 
The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance (Boston: 
South End Press, 1987), 22 
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the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there still maintained 
the sale of countries with inhabitants?"71   
The Philippine War erupted because of the tensions arising out of the United 
States decision to remain in the Philippines.  Actual hostilities broke out on 4 February 
1899 after two American soldiers on patrol killed three Filipino soldiers at the San Juan 
Bridge located outside Manila.72  The conflict that followed was the first American 
insurgency war in Asia.  It involved a total of 126,000 American soldiers with 4,234 
killed in action.73  Approximately 16,000 Filipino soldiers died during this war which 
lasted from 1899 to 1902.74  “According to historian Gregorio Zaide, as many as 200,000 
civilians died, largely because of famine and disease, by the end of the war.”75
Filipino critics point out that America’s entry into world power politics in the late 
19th century was clothed with the ideals of freedom and liberty that bore a resemblance to 
the goals of the current American policy in pursuit of “democratic peace.”76  Comparing 
the 1898 Spanish-American War in the Philippines to the current war in Iraq, Filipino 
critic Alexander Martin Remollino stated:  
As is now [sic] the case with the war on Iraq, the war in the Philippines 
was premised on “regime change.” The war in the Philippines purportedly 
aimed to oust the Spanish colonial rulers and “liberate” its inhabitants; the 
war on Iraq, among other things, supposedly aims to oust its leader 
Saddam Hussein in a quest to “liberate” the Iraqi people from decades of 
tyranny…The [Spanish-American] war ended with American colonial rule 
over the Philippines – the result of a war which promised liberation for the 
Filipino people [from Spanish colonialism].77
 
71 Library of Congress, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris” 
72 Library of Congress, “War of Resistance,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet:   
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0025) (accessed 01/22/05)   
See Linn, 42-46; and Agoncillo, 217 
73 Ibid., Library of Congress, “War of Resistance” 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid; see Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (London: Longman, 1960); and Russell Roth, Muddy 
Glory: America’s “Indian Wars” in the Philippines, 1899-1935 (West Hanover, MA: Christopher, 1981) 
76 Alexander Martin Remollino, “The Iraq-Pinaglabanan Parallel,” Bulatlat 3 (March-April 2003), 
from the internet:  http://www.bulatlat.org/news/3-9/3-9-pinaglabanan.html (accessed 02/02/05) 
77 Ibid. 
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Political groups that oppose American military forward presence in the 
Philippines were not disinclined to cite this historical fact.  The precedents of the 19th 
century history served to bolster the criticisms of current American foreign policy.    
The detractors from the political left often cite the laws enacted during the 
colonial rule in addition to the “unequal treaties”78 signed with the United States after 
independence as the baseline sources of the economic and political ills that beset 
Philippine growth and development.   For example, Jose Maria Sison (founder of the 
Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines) lambasted the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 for 
perpetuating a colonial and agrarian economy.79  Under this law, American finished 
goods were imported into the Philippines free of tariff, and the quota limitations of raw 
materials exported to the United States was lifted in 1913.80  According to Sison, “The 
increasing avalanche of finished goods into the country crushed local handicrafts and 
manufacturers and furthermore compelled the people to buy these finished goods and to 
produce raw materials mainly.”81   
The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 provided for the adoption of the 1935 
Philippine constitution and the commonwealth government with a provision for the 
eventual independence ten years after the ratification of the constitution.82  Sison 
criticized the contents of this law, as follows: 
The law made sure that among so many imperialist privileges, U.S. 
citizens and corporations would retain their property rights in the 
Philippines, that the U.S. government would be able to station its troops 
and occupy large areas of Philippine territory as its military bases and that 
 
78 “Unequal treaties” were a series of treaties between the United States and the Philippines which 
gave the former “…arrangements reflecting the undiminished control of the Philippines” (Jose Maria 
Sison).  These treaties include the U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement, and other agreements listed by Sison.  Cited from Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and 
Revolution (PSR), 30 January 1970, from the internet:  
http://www.geocities.com/kabataangmakabayan64/psr.pdf  (02/27/05), 42.  Amado Guerrero was the nom 
de guerre of Jose Maria Sison, founder of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).  He was 
the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPP at the time when the PSR was published in 1970. 
79 Ibid.  Jose Maria Sison was also the founder of the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) in 
1964.  The reaffirmist faction of the CPP retained control of the New People’s Army and the National 
Democratic Front (“united front” political arm of the CPP).  These groups are vehemently opposed to any – 
permanent or temporary - American access to base facilities in the Philippines. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, 14 
82 The Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act), from the internet: 
http://www.chanrobles.com/tydingsmcduffieact.htm (accessed 01/22/05) 
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the United States and the Philippines would maintain free trade…U.S. 
imperialism rigged up the Constitutional Convention of 1935.  Delegates 
came overwhelmingly from the comprador big bourgeoisie and the 
landlord class.83
The Philippines was briefly occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945 before it 
received its independence from the United States on 4 July 1946.  Critics from the left 
cited the “unequal treaties” signed by the Philippines and the United States as a 
manifestation of the “neocolonial” relationship.84  The series of treaties signed with the 
United States considered by Filipino nationalists as detrimental to Philippine national 
independence include the Bell Trade Act (amended by the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 
1954), the U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, and others.  The Bell Trade Act 
was linked to the “parity amendment” of the Philippine constitution, which gave 
Americans equal or parity rights to dispose, develop, exploit, and utilize “all agricultural, 
timber, and mineral lands” of the Philippines.85  The agreement encompassed the right of 
Americans to operate public utilities and exploitation of water, coal, petroleum, and 
mineral resources of the Philippines.86  “Payment of war damages amounting to US$620 
million, as stipulated in the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, was made contingent 
[by the U.S. Congress] on the Philippine acceptance of the parity clause.”87
The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 gave the United States de facto control of 
twenty-three military bases and facilities on Philippine territory, including Clark Air Base 
and the facilities at Subic Bay Naval Base.88  Continued American control of Philippine 
territories without the mechanism of direct colonial rule represented the cornerstone of 
the neo-colonial relationship.89  The Military Assistance Agreement was also signed in 
1947 and provided for the establishment of the Joint United States Military Advisory 
 
83 Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, 17 
84 Ibid. 
85 Agoncillo, 433 
86 Ibid. 
87 Library of Congress Country Studies, “Economic Relations with the United States after 
Independence,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet:  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0035) (accessed 01/22/05)  
88 Library of Congress Country Studies, “Security Agreements,” Philippines – Country Study, from 
the internet:  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0036) (accessed 01/22/03)  
89 See footnote 8 and 9 
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Group to advise and train the Philippine armed forces and to authorize the transfer of 
equipment and material.90  Jose Maria Sison criticized these military agreements in his 
book, Philippine Society and Revolution,91 as follows:  
The U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement, 1947. Under this agreement, 
U.S. imperialism retains its control over the entire Philippine territory. The 
Filipino people are literally in a large prison surrounded by strategically 
located U.S. land, air and naval bases.92
The U.S.-R.P. Military Assistance Pact, 1947. This unequal treaty further 
ensures U.S. imperialist control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP). Through the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), U.S. 
imperialism extends strategic and staff direction, logistics, training and 
intelligence coordination to the reactionary Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. U.S. military advisers exercise direct control over the A.F.P.93
The Philippines received military assistance from the United States to stem the 
threat of the communist Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or National Liberation 
Army, popularly known as Huks in the 1950s.94  The JUSMAG provided an estimated 
total of $200 million to the AFP in the early 1950s.95  According to historian Benedict 
Kerkvliet, the rebellion was primarily driven by tenant-landlord conflicts and not by 
 
90 Library of Congress, “Security Agreements” 
91 Philippine Society and Revolution laid down the basic doctrine of the “national democratic” Left 
and the party line of the CPP.  It is the source document of the study materials used in the CPP-NDF-NPA 
indoctrination.  Patricio N. Abinales described the book as the “so-called ‘Bible of the Revolution.’” See 
Patricio N. Abinales, “Asia’s Last People’s War:  The Communist Insurgency in Post-Marcos Philippines,” 
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92 Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, 43 
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94 The Huk rebellion was a peasant revolt that developed in the provinces of Central Luzon between 
1946 through the early 1950s.  According to Kerkvliet, the “vast majority of people [in Central Luzon] 
were share tenants …they work the land that someone else owned and divided the harvest with the 
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modernization that began during the American colonial period and the introduction of capitalism created 
the conditions that altered the social ties that bind this relationship.  The tenants could no longer rely on the 
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tenants’ grievances escalated into an open revolt and found expression through the HMB movement.  
Benedict J Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1977), 5, 7, 25 and 157 
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communist ideology.96  Violent agrarian unrest in the Philippines had a long tradition that 
date back several centuries.97  The Philippine government often sided with the landlords 
in these land disputes.98  By supporting the Philippine military against the peasant 
rebellion, the United States may have been perceived as perpetuating the feudal or semi-
feudal relationships between the landlords and peasants in some parts of the Philippines.  
Given that the Bell Trade Act and later the Laurel-Langley Agreement fostered the 
economic viability of raw material commodity exports (e.g., sugar) to the United States, 
it reinforced the rent-seeking behavior of the big land-owners that were involved in these 
landlord-peasant conflicts.   
Even though the primary reason for the American support of the Philippine 
counter-insurgency program against the Huks was ideological, PKP/HMB propaganda 
attempted to portray it differently to the peasants and workers in the Philippines.99  The 
ideological component of the United States position during the Cold War was well 
articulated in NSC 68 (United States Objectives and Programs for National Security), 
which spelled out the conflict of ideas and values between America and the Soviet 
Union.100  There was also a fundamental American interest in suppressing the Huk 
rebellion that is rooted in the need to secure the American military bases in the 
Philippines  that  could  have been threatened by a communist take-over of the Philippine  
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state.101  The loss of the American military bases at Clark and Subic would have dealt a 
serious blow to the strategic position of the United States in Asia at the period of the 
escalating Cold War. 
American support against the communist insurgency in the Philippines was 
perceived and portrayed by its critics as a direct intervention to secure the sources of raw 
materials for the United States commodities market.102  The timing of the trade treaties 
(1953 Agreement Relating to Entry of U.S. Traders and the 1954 Laurel-Langley 
Agreement) in proximity of the mutual defense and military assistance pacts made them 
suspect in the eyes of Filipino left-wing nationalists.  Current discourses against the 
American military forward presence in the Philippines reflect a similar interpretation.  
For example, the recent press release of the CPP stated, “CPP sees link between mining 
and US [sic] troop deployments.”103  Criticisms about resources exploitation were 
common in the past arguments of the pro-Moscow Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) 
and its successor, the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).  Sison 
characterized the Laurel-Langley Agreement as follows: 
This new treaty aggravated the economic subservience of the Philippines 
to U.S. imperialism by allowing the U.S. monopolies to enjoy parity rights 
in all kinds of businesses. Adjustments in the quota system and 
preferential treatment for Philippine raw materials were made only to 
deepen the colonial and agrarian character of the economy.104
As a result of the preferential treatment given by the United States to commodity 
materials produced in the Philippines, a lucrative market arose for the agricultural sector  
101 National Security Council, A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the 
Position of the United States with respect to the Philippines, 9 November 1950, Digital National Security 
Archive,  from the internet: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cgi-
bin/cqcgi?CQ_SESSION_KEY=XJJKGOPYWATO&CQ_DTF_CAT_ITEMS=1&CQDOC=34&CQ_QU
ERY_HANDLE=140490   
102 “In 1951, the Quirino puppet regime had the U.S.-R.P. Mutual Defense Treaty ratified, allowing 
the United States to intervene arbitrarily in Philippine affairs under the pretext of mutual protection. In 
1953, Quirino signed the agreement extending indefinitely the effectivity [sic] of the U.S.-R.P. Military 
Assistance Pact which was first signed in 1947. Also in 1953 the Agreement Relating to Entry of U.S. 
Traders and investors was signed, facilitating the entry of U.S. capital and managerial personnel into the 
Philippines.” Source:  Jose Maria Sison, Philippine Society and Revolution 
103 “There is a close link between the Arroyo regime's all-out campaign to lure foreign mining 
companies to plunder Philippine mineral resources and the escalation of US military intervention.”  Source:  
Communist Party of the Philippines, Press Release 8 February 2005, from the internet:  
http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-bin/statements/releases.pl?date=050208a;refer=kr;language=eng 
(accessed 02/08/05) 
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that primarily benefited the large land-owners and the agricultural based industries like 
sugar-mills and refineries.  It essentially reduced the economic incentives to invest in 
other industries (like manufacturing) that could have stimulated the growth of a vigorous 
and independent bourgeoisie as a requisite of democracy.  Barrington Moore identified 
the industrial and the commercial middle classes as the main social forces in the modern 
era that is favorable to democracy.105  Although the colonial (under the United States) 
and the post-colonial Philippine economy underwent a limited form of capitalist 
development, it did not create the accelerated conditions ripe for the industrial and 
commercial take-off that could have significantly produced a large market for “free” 
labor or a dominant, revolutionary and vibrant bourgeoisie.  The conditions of post-
independence Philippine politics were influenced heavily by the political economy 
dominated by the land-owning oligarchy that had benefited from the colonial policies 
previously noted (Payne-Aldrich Act) and the post-colonial treaties like the Bell Trade 
Act and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.106  The Philippine state was basically captured 
by the landed interests in what Benedict Anderson called “cacique democracy” or what 
Damien Kingsbury termed “oligarchic democracy.”107  While democratic institutions and 
processes (elections) were in place in the Philippines since independence from the United 
States, the competing economic elites had the financial resources to build and run the 
effective political machineries necessary to capture the state.  The overwhelming 
representations of the oligarchic elites in the legislative and the executive branches as 
well as in key positions of the bureaucracy meant that their interests were well 
represented and the state remained less responsive to the demands of the subaltern 
classes. 
As part of the Cold War containment strategy, the United States became involved 
in the Vietnam War.  The military facilities in the Philippines played an important 
 
105 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:  Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); see Democratization, ed. David Potter, David 
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supporting role as a logistics base and as a safe location for rest and recreation.  Because 
of the increased presence of American troops in the Philippines, the incidents involving 
local residents and U.S. service members became more pronounced.  The issue of 
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving Americans was contested by Filipino 
nationalists who saw the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as granting extraterritorial 
rights that compromised national sovereignty.108  The current opposition to the Visiting 
Forces Agreement (VFA) often cited the jurisdiction issue.109
The escalation of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s also stirred memories of the 
Philippine War and inspired a renewed nationalism among the Filipino youth.  A revival 
of nationalist groups among academics and students started with the goal not only to 
protest against the war in Vietnam, but also to demand the ouster of the American 
military bases in the Philippines.  President Lyndon Johnson’s attendance at the Manila 
Summit in 1964 was greeted by “no less than 3,000 students and members of the 
nationalistic Kabataang Makabayan.”110  The militant Kabataang Makabayan (KM) was 
formally organized by Jose Maria Sison on 30 November 1964.111   According to Sison, 
from its inception the KM “…was committed to arouse, organize and mobilize the youth 
from the toiling masses of workers and peasants and the middle social strata for the 
revolutionary struggle for national liberation and democracy.”112  During the early years 
of the KM, controversy erupted over whether the organization was a purely nationalist 
organization or was organized by Sison at the behest of the PKP leadership.113
During his second term in office, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial 
law on 21 September 1972 because of mounting agitation and unrests as a result of 
serious problems in the economy.  In addition, he may have had an ulterior motive for 
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declaring martial law to extend his rule beyond the two-term limits.114  Marcos abolished 
the legislature and arrested anybody who opposed him by branding them 
“communists.”115
The period of martial law saw the curtailment of the freedom of the press and 
assembly.  Labor unions, student organizations, and the media were silenced.  In addition, 
the Marcos regime took control of utility companies and vital industries owned by his 
political opponents.116  Another explanation for the declaration of martial law was the 
belief of leftist-nationalists that Marcos was an “imperialist lackey” who was out to 
protect American interests and investments in the Philippines.117  At the time when 
martial law was declared, there was an estimated $2 to $3 billion dollars in American 
investments in the Philippines and the presence of the U.S. military air and naval 
bases.118  The acquiescence of American policy makers to the suspension of civil 
liberties in the Philippines after martial law and the continued support of the Marcos 
regime had a deleterious effect on the political standing of the United States among the 
Filipino citizens.  When the anti-Marcos protests escalated after the assassination of 
Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983, the United States also became a target of the protests.  
“Persistent calls for Marcos’s resignation have increasingly been joined by demands for 
an end to the U.S. presence in the Philippines.”119
Jose Maria Sison’s Philippine Society and Revolution is the most prominent work 
in the Philippine left in terms of the criticism of the post-independence American military 
presence in the Philippines.  Sison used the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoist Thought to analyze the United States and Philippine relationship.   Even though 
the leftist movement in the Philippines fragmented into different factions or ideological 
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tendencies, the current approaches of these groups regarding the American military 
presence under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Logistics Support 
Agreement (MLSA) share a similar thread found in Sison’s arguments.  The differences 
of these groups were discussed in Chapter III, Section A of this thesis.  
 
B. THE MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS AND THE UNITED STATES-THAI 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Thailand’s military had been actively engaged in politics (and had a propensity 
for coup d’états) even before the American aid was forthcoming at the beginning of the 
Cold War.  There had been four successful coups since 1932 before the American support 
for the Thai military and police began in the late 1940s.120  As a variable, U.S. military 
aid and presence may not have contributed to these tendencies.  However, it cannot be 
denied that American military and economic aid did strengthen the authoritarian military 
regimes during this period.  
By the 1950s, the provision of U.S. military aid gave the military and the police 
an overwhelming coercive power not only to contain the threat of communist insurgency, 
but also to quell legitimate dissent from the Thai citizenry.  Civil society’s opinion about 
the U.S. military forward presence during the democratization period (1973-1976) was 
partly influenced by the public’s perception of the American support of the previous Thai 
military and military-controlled regimes.  According to Daniel Fineman, American policy 
during this period was not compatible with Thai democracy because it sought to increase 
the Thai military power, repress the criticism of the United States, and conduct covert 
operations with minimal interference.121
America’s initial entry into Thailand’s domestic politics was discrete, but 
overwhelmingly influential because of the massive amounts of military and economic aid 
that went along with it.  The downfall of the Kuomintang in China and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was a prelude to 
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a secret Cold War armed struggle in the border areas of Burma.  Kuomintang forces 
supported by the United States attempted to gain a foothold in the southern province of 
Yunnan.  Thailand became a “front-line” state in the struggle between the opposing 
forces of the KMT and the CCP.  In addition, the American containment strategy to 
prevent the spread of falling “dominoes” in Asia made Thailand a bulwark against the 
spread of communism.122  The United States needed facilities and bases in Thailand to 
provide logistical support to KMT forces along the Burma-China border.  American 
officials requested Thailand’s assistance in funneling arms and KMT forces to the 
Burmese sanctuaries.  Since Thailand felt threatened by the expansion of communism 
along its borders and a potential PRC-supported insurgency, it acceded to the American 
request.  Phibun’s alignment with the United States had an effect on the form of Thai 
regimes that extended beyond his time. 
According to Fineman, prior to granting Thailand the military aid, “…civilians 
retained a significant voice in the making of the Thai foreign policy.”123  The tremendous 
amount of U.S. military aid to the Thai armed forces and police increased their clout in 
relation to the civilian influence over policy decisions.124  As the power shifted in favor 
of the military elites within the Thai government, Phibun and the Coup Group became 
less tolerant of internal dissent especially from political left.125  “The Thai government, 
as a result, began at this point to promote…authoritarianism that would later lead it to 
outright dictatorship.”126
Between 1951 and 1957, Thailand received $149 million in economic aid and 
$222 million in military aid.127  “Even excluding the large covert programs, for which 
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figures are not available, the 1953 aid accounted for more than 70 percent of all the 
money reported spent – Thai and American – on Thai defenses that year.”128  The 
military aid not only funded the modernization of the air force and navy, but it also 
strengthened the army and the police.  The army and the police were the primary services 
employed as the coercive arm of the state.  The Thai Border Police funded by the United 
States security assistance would later organize the right-wing mass movement in the 
1970s called the Village Scouts.  The Village Scouts Movement was involved in the 
suppression of the left-wing student protests against the presence of American military 
bases in Thailand.129
Thai police force grew to about 43,000 men in 1954 and was instrumental in the 
coercion of the civilian population and the suppression of anti-government 
movements.130  The Coup Group benefited from funds provided by the American 
military assistance because they were outside the parliament’s budgetary control.131  This 
arrangement sometimes placed the legislators at risk because it minimized their leverage 
in controlling the police and the military.  Without parliamentary oversight, the Thai 
police was able to commit unlawful actions with impunity including the assassination of 
members of the parliament.132   
During the ceremony on 29 June 1951 transferring the American dredge 
Manhattan to the Thai Navy, a group of junior naval officers kidnapped Phibun and held 
him hostage at the flagship Si Ayutthaya.133  The army and the police besieged the naval 
bases and a CIA-supplied mortar was reportedly used by the police to sink the Si 
Ayutthaya even with the knowledge that Phibun was held hostage in the ship.134  “Many 
Thais, as a result, blamed the United States for the bloodshed accompanying the 
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conflict.”135  An estimated 1,200 casualties, mostly civilians, died in the crossfire when 
the army and the police attacked the naval bases.136   
The United States did not underwrite the coercive power of the Thai state with the 
purpose of undermining democracy in Thailand.  However, the corollary of the military 
aid given to the Thai military and the Ministry of Interior was the expansion of the forces 
responsible for cracking down on civilian dissent.  To translate the impact of U.S. aid in 
concrete terms:  
In 1955, for example, the cumulative U.S. military aid per member of the 
Thai armed forces was about $907…What this figure really meant was 
that each member of the Thai armed forces in 1955 was given 
approximately $907 worth of additional capacity to apply physical 
violence built into him by U.S. military assistance.  By comparison, the 
per capita income of Thailand in 1955 was about $72.137  
Vibhatakarasa Jin says that, “For the purpose of intervening in domestic politics, 
the importance of military resources…was quite obvious.  It was the ‘imbalance of 
growth’ in favor of the military that enabled it to intervene successfully in politics.”138  
Vibhatakarasa also stated that in Thailand, “the military officers were more authoritarian 
and more conservative than civilians.”139  He based this assessment on data collected 
from military cadets and college students using a “quasi-longitudinal design.”140  From 
the foregoing, it was obvious that the United States had a significant impact on the 
domestic politics of Thailand by supporting a military that happened to be both 
authoritarian and ultraconservative. 
During the 1960s, the United States became heavily committed to the Vietnam 
War.  American forces needed bases to launch its air attacks against North Vietnam and 
the neighboring countries that harbor the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).   Thailand and 
the United States signed the Rusk-Thanat [named after then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk and then-Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman] Agreement with the American 
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pledge to defend Thailand unilaterally in the event of aggression, without the prior 
agreement of the other parties to the Manila Pact of 1954.141  This agreement paved the 
way for the increased American military forward presence in Thailand in the mid-late 
1960s.  Construction of seven major American air bases in Thailand started in 1965.   The 
new air bases were located at:  (1) Nakhon Phanom, (2) Udorn (3) Ubon, (4) Korat, (5) 
Takhli, (6) Don Muang, and (7) U-Tapao.142  The U.S. Marine Corps would also open 
their own base at Nam Phong located northwest of Bangkok.143  “Although more than 
45,000 United States troops and 500 combat aircraft were stationed in the country by 
1968, their mission was not officially acknowledged for fear of possible communist 
retaliation against Thailand.”144
The increased American presence on Thailand was preceded by an infusion of 
military and economic aid.  From 1958-1967, Thailand received a total of $797.6 million 
in combined military ($439.2 million) and economic aid ($358.9 million).145  During the 
peak year of American military bases construction and spending in 1968, the level of 
aggregate demand (GNP) reached 117.3 billion baht ($5.6 billion at the official 
exchanged rate).146   The American net military spending during the same year was $235 
million or 4.2 percent of the GNP, the economic aid was slightly less than one percent 
and the military aid was one percent of GNP.147  Considering the multiplier effects of 
U.S. military spending on the Thai economy, 11 percent of the aggregate demand was 
 
141 Library of Congress Country Studies, “Foreign Affairs – Background,”  Thailand – Country Study 
from the internet:  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0129) (accessed 
02/06/05)  
142 Jeffrey D. Glasser, The Secret Vietnam War:  The United States Air Force in Thailand, 1961-1975. 
(Jefferson, NC:  McFarland & Company, Inc., 1995), 10 
143 The U.S. Marine Corps established an airfield at Nam Phong, Thailand after the North Vietnamese 
Easter Offensive in 1972.  An F-4J unit of the Marine Corps called MAG-15was redeployed to Nam Phong 
from Danang, South Vietnam in June of that year.  Source:  “History of Marine Corps Aviation, Vietnam: 
1968-1975,” from the internet:  http://www.acepilots.com/usmc/hist19.html (accessed 02/27/05) 
144 Library of Congress Country Studies, “Thai Politics and Foreign Policy, 1963-1971,” Thailand – 
Country Study, from the internet:  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0039) 
(accessed 01/28/05) 
145 Wyatt, 284  The total figures of military-economic aid were calculated based on figures from Table 
1 
146 George G. Viksnins, “United States Military Spending and the Economy of Thailand, 1967-1972,” 
Asian Survey 13, no. 5 (May 1973), 444 
147 Ibid. 
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estimated to have come from this source.148  Besides the benefits of the American aid and 
military spending, Thailand was also motivated to allow American military presence 
because of security concerns in neighboring Laos and Cambodia.  The Laos situation 
deteriorated into a civil war after the defense minister Phoumi Nosavan ousted the 
neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma from the capital of Vientiane and installed a 
right-wing regime in December 1960.149  In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
established closer relations with China.150  Thailand severed relations with Prince 
Sihanouk and instead supported pro-Western forces led by General Lon Nol who ousted 
Sihanouk in a bloodless coup d’état on 18 March 1970.151  The increasing influence of 
communism in Indochina was partly used to justify the legitimacy of military rule in 
Thailand. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, there was a steady growth in education in Thailand 
that reflected the expansion of the middle classes.   Between 1947 and 1970, the number 
of college graduates in Thailand multiplied by 18.6 times (from 10,000 to 186,000).152  
Secondary education graduates increased by 6.6 times (from 87,000 to 575,000) during 
the same period.153  The growing number of secondary and university graduates gave 
Thailand a critical mass of an emerging middle class.154  According to Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija: 
Rapid socioeconomic changes often create uncertainties and sometimes 
instability and disorder.  In fact, democratic values and norms brought 
about by these changes are the antithesis of , and pose great challenges to, 
 
148 Viksnins, 444 
149 Souvanna Phouma believed that Laos’ chance of survival was through a neutral foreign policy to 
assuage the concerns of both the Western and the Communist powers.  Thai leaders viewed Phouma with 
suspicion because of his friendly relations with the communist Pathet Lao.  See Donald E. Nuechterlein, 
Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 174-175 
150 Sihanouk sought a closer relationship with China and the Soviet Union as a counterweight to an 
aggressive Vietnam.  See Kenneth Ray Young, “Neutralism in Laos and Cambodia,” International Studies 
Quarterly 14, no. 2 (June 1970), 223-224  
151 Young, 219 
152 Wyatt, 295 
153 Ibid., 295 
154 Ibid., 295 
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traditional values of the military elites, who welcome modernization and 
development as long as stability and order can be maintained.155
The long period of authoritarian rule under Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy 
Prime Minister Praphat made their regime (1963-1973) complacent and unresponsive to 
constituents’ demands.156  The incompetence and corruption of the Thanom-Praphat 
regime gave way to increasing desire for constitutional rule.  These sentiments were 
shared by the broad strata of urban society that included the king of Thailand.  The 
military regime was wracked by a series of scandals.  It was also blamed for the 
insufficient supply of rice to the cities and the onset of rising prices that accompanied the 
world recession in 1973.157  By the early 1970s, the Thai middle-class and students began 
clamoring for political change.  The university students led by the leftist National Student 
Center of Thailand (NSCT) played a major role in the anti-government agitation and 
demonstrations beginning in June 1973.  This flurry of activity culminated in the October 
Revolution.  On 13 October, about 400,000 students marched from Thammasat 
University to the Democracy Monument in what was then the largest mass action in Thai 
history.158  The demonstrations were partly motivated by the students’ frustration with 
the job prospects after graduation and a myriad of other issues.159  The student protests 
escalated into a full-blown revolt that toppled General Thanom’s regime and ushered a 
new albeit short era of democracy in Thailand.160  The brief period of democratization 
created the conditions for expressing heretofore suppressed freedom of speech, the press 
and assembly.  The process of democratization between 1973 and 1976 rekindled the 
 
155 Chai-anan Samudavanija, “Thailand:  A Stable Semidemocracy,” Politics in Developing 
Countries:  Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour 
Martin Lipset (Boulder:  L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), 352 
156 John S. L. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1981), 115  
The Thanom and Praphat regime succeeded General Sarit’s authoritarian rule after his death in 1963.  
General Sarit Thanarat’s regime (1958-1963) took power after a coup in 1958 which abrogated the 1952 
constitution and dissolved the Pote Sarasin caretaker government.  Prior to this, Sarasin’s government 
succeeded Phibun’s regime in 1957 when the latter fled into exile. (See Girling, 110-113) 
157 Ibid. 
158 See Bowie, 94.  See also Wyatt, 299 
159 “In October 1973 police arrested lecturers and undergraduates organizing a meeting to protest 
about the delays in constitutional reform.  This triggered a mass rally at Thammasat University that was 
joined by other universities.”  Source:  Elliot Kulick and Dick Wilson, Thailand’s Turn:  Profile of a New 
Dragon (London:  MacMillan Press, 1992), 28 
160 Thanom Kittikachorn ruled as the military dictator of Thailand from 1963 until his regime was 
overthrown by the student revolt in 1973.  Source:  Kulick and Wilson, 28-29 
36 
                                                
debates about the presence of American military bases in Thailand.  The role of the 
students in anti-American political mobilization became more manifest during the anti-
military bases protests after the Mayaguez incident in 1975. 
The communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 and the consolidation 
of the Pathet Lao in neighboring Laos increased anxieties in Thailand.  With the U.S. 
military drawdown in Indochina and the American rapprochement with China, the Thai 
government had doubts about the American commitment to defend Thailand.  As a result, 
the Thai government wanted to improve relations with neighboring communist states like 
China and Cambodia.  It was during this period of uneasiness when the Khmer Rouge 
seized the American merchant vessel the Mayaguez.  The United States military 
attempted to recover the ship and her crew using air bases in Thailand.  Prior to this 
action, the Kukrit Pramoj161 government informed the American charge d’affaires that it 
would not authorize the use of Thai bases against Cambodia.162  The Thai government 
filed a protest when American forces used military bases in Thailand without the proper 
authorization.163   
The Mayaguez incident is still remembered in Thailand as one of the low points in 
Thai-American relations, referring to the U.S.-Thai trade relations in 1999, a Bangkok 
Post article stated: 
Recent events have stirred a widespread sense of nationalism and anti-
Americanism among Thai people for the first time since the Mayaguez 
incident 27 years ago.  At the time, America arrogantly sent troops to 
Thailand to seize its ship back from the Khmer Rouge without prior 
consultation with Thailand. This violation of sovereignty triggered anti-
American resentment among Thai people nationwide. Many came out to 
protest and rallied in front of the US Embassy.164
 
161 Seni Pramoj was elected in the January 1975 elections with no clear majority.  The House voted a 
no confidence on 6 March and dissolved the newly formed government.  Kukrit Pramoj, his brother, 
managed to form a successor government with a new coalition of seventeen parties of the center and the 
right.  Kukrit negotiated a promised withdrawal of American troops and a resumption of diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China.  Source:  Wyatt, 301.  See also Samudavanija, 332 
162 “The National Student Center accused the U.S. of using the seizure of the Mayaguez as a pretext to 
intervene again in Indochina.  A Thai government spokesman accused the U.S. [sic] May 15 of committing 
a ‘breach of faith’ in using Thai territory for recovery of the Mayaguez.”  Source:  “U.S. Force Battle 
Cambodians, Destroy Three Gunboats, Retake Seized American Ship; 39 U.S. crewmen rescued,” from the 
Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/10/05) 
163 Glasser, 214 
164 “Friends for life?”  Bangkok Post, 30 May 1999, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/10/05) 
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Kukrit Pramoj’s foreign policy of non-alignment involved a reduction of 
American forces in Thailand, recognition of the PRC, and rapprochement with Vietnam 
and Kampuchea.  This move was influenced by the external events previously mentioned.  
On the domestic front, the political mobilization of left-wing and liberal social forces 
(student groups, labor unions, academics, “left” democratic parties) had continued 
unabated since the 1973 student revolt.  This alarmed both military officials and the 
wealthy elite.165  “The rightist reaction took the form of building up the Nawaphon 
[rightist] movement, rallying around the patriotic theme of ‘Nation, Religion, King,’ 
mobilizing the royally sponsored ‘village scouts,’ vocational student gangs, and 
demagogic media personalities against the ‘left’…”166  According to Girling, the return 
of former dictators Thanom and Praphat was part of the rightist strategy to provoke 
student protests which culminated in the October 6 military-police and rightists 
crackdown at Thammasat University.167  The right-wing violence at Thammasat was 
followed by a military coup and the declaration of martial law which abolished the 
previous constitution and prohibited political parties.  Opposition members were harassed 
and hundreds of political activists fled abroad in self-exile or joined the underground.  
Some of the students who sought refuge in the rural areas joined the broad “united front” 
of the combined socialist and communist parties.168
A critic of the American military presence in 1973 stated with both hindsight and 
prescience that, “…the presence of foreign forces encourages and fosters what may be 
called ‘military democracy,” an authoritarian regime which deprives or curtails the 
 
165 Girling, Thailand Society and Politics, 116 
166 Ibid.  See also Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty, 105-106 for a brief description of the 
Nawaphon and the Red Gaur (Krathing Daeng) recruitment, organization, and activities.  According to 
Bowie, Nawaphon was founded by Wattana Kiewvimol and claimed membership of 150,000 in 1975.  Its 
members were recruited from the elite, e.g., members of the provincial bureaucracy, influential 
businessmen, as well as monks.  In contrast, the Red Gaurs was a right-wing organization of hired 
vigilantes drawn mainly from unemployed vocational graduates, high school drop-outs and slum toughs.  
The Red Gaurs was directly organized by Colonel Sudsai Hasadin, the leader of the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC).  Red Gaurs vigilantes were notorious for violence like the firebombing of 
the liberal New Force Party headquarters in Bangkok.  This was the same group suspected of attacking the 
anti-American demonstrators with grenades and plastic bombs during a protest on 21 March 1976.  The 
demonstrators were demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand.   
167 Ibid., 116-117 
168 David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand’s Revolutionary Insurgency:  Changes in 
Leadership Potential,” Asian Survey 19, no. 4 (April 1979), 320 
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freedom and civil liberties of citizens.”169  The political left is no longer a significant 
force in present-day Thailand.  However, the voice of leftist nationalism would 
occasionally echo in the discourse of individual liberals in the media, academia and the 
political institutions.  These critics enunciated their concern about the American military 
forward presence in Thailand during the recent conflicts in the Middle East and even 
during the tsunami relief operations that was based at Utapao.170  
 
169 Thanat Khoman, “Thailand in the Midst of Changes,” Trends in Thailand, ed. M. Rajaretnam and 
Lim So Jean (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), 110-114.  Cited from Darling, 
Thailand Society and Politics, 239 
170 “Military and civilian agencies from other countries cooperated with the US troops in bringing 
relief to the devastated areas amid suspicion among local and regional nationalists that the base might be 
used for hidden military operations.”  Source:  “Rumours Spreads on Increased Presence of U.S. Military in 
Thailand,” 2 February 2005, Thai Press Reports, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/07/05) 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF GROUPS OPPOSED TO U.S. MILITARY 
FORWARD PRESENCE 
Groups opposed to the American military forward presence in both Thailand and 
the Philippines were a product of history and ideology.  The left-wing nationalists in the 
Philippines view the current access issues related to the VFA and the MLSA as the 
continuation of the drama that had roots in the colonial and the neocolonial past.  They 
still see the new agreements as “neocolonial” regardless of U.S. good faith in respecting 
the Philippine decision not to extend the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991.  
Philippine sovereignty over the American bases was amply demonstrated when the 
Philippine Senate voted 12 to 11 against the extension of the MBA beyond 1991.171
The current discourse from the far left represented by Sison’s CPP remained 
heavily laden with ideological bombast that reflects a typical Marxist-Leninist 
weltanschauung of the Cold War era.  Sison and his ilk still see the CPP as the vanguard 
party that could save the Philippines from the grasp of a Manichean plot hatched by “U.S. 
imperialism and monopoly capitalism.”  The CPP and its allies in the NDF view armed 
struggle as the only route to change the system, i.e., this section of the left is anti-system 
even though it supported the “legal struggle" via electoral participation of “national 
democratic” leftist party-list candidates in the last elections.   
In sharp contrast, there is a portion of the Philippine left that genuinely believes 
that the era of “vanguard party” elitism is a thing of the past.  A variety of leftists and 
center-left groups has a stake in the current political system and seeks changes via 
participation in the existing political institutions and processes as the norm, and not just a 
tactic of revolutionary struggle.  Because of the open debates in the political process, any 
American requests for access to base facilities during contingencies have a better chance 
of approval in the Philippine Congress if it is congruent with the perceived or defined 
Philippine national interests.  Unlike the ideological basis in nationalism of the CPP and 
the NDF, which totally rule out any American military presence, the center-left 
politicians in the legislature are likely to consider the issue on a case by case basis.   
                                                 
171 “Philippine Senate Rejects Base Treaty with U.S.,” 16 September 1991, Central News Agency – 
Taiwan, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05) 
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The right-wing nationalist movement dissipated after the closure of the American 
bases at Clark and Subic Bay in 1991 and 1992, respectively.  This movement may be 
latent and cannot be totally ruled out because its ideas and sentiments remain, as 
evidenced by the reaction from certain quarters of the Philippine military to the forward 
presence of American military personnel in Mindanao in 2004 (see below). 
Filipino Muslim opposition to the American military presence in the Philippines 
coalesced around leftist (secular) organized protest activities in Manila or religious-based 
political mobilization in predominantly Muslim areas in the southern Philippines.  The 
NDF established a front organization called the Moro Revolutionary Organization 
(MRO) as an “underground organization of Moro people in Mindanao, southern 
Philippines” (See Appendix A).  It is not clear if some of the protests in Mindanao were 
related to the MILF insurgent activity or if it was organized by independent Muslim 
groups or individuals.   
The political left in Thailand was decimated by rightist violence in the 1970s and 
has been in hiatus ever since.  Those who belong to the generation of leftist student 
activists in the 1970s are now respected members of the establishment, e.g., business, 
media, politics, and the academia.172  Complaints against the United States military 
access to Thai base facilities are often heard from a variety of individuals that ranged 
from members of the parliament to journalists.  The Thai Muslim protests against the 
American military forward presence in Thailand and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
appear to be organized by a variety of civil society groups.   
 
A. LEFTIST NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES  
 
Even before the 1972 declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the political 
left was divided into the Maoist (CPP), Marxist-Leninist (old PKP) and the non-
 
172 Patricio Abinales suggested that like in the Philippines some former elements of the Left in 
Thailand found themselves in the corridors of power years later.  “(We have something similar going on 
under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Sergio Berloscuni’s Thai counterpart; ex-Maoists crafting his 
corporatization of the Thai state; and likewise in Indonesia where old Bandung radicals now form the inner 
circle of President Megawati Sukarnoputri).”  Source:  Patricio Abinales, “Which Anti-Communism?  
Reflections from the Philippines,” Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, from the internet:  
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/icas/Patricio.pdf (accessed 02/12/05) 
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communist left (mainly the social democrats).  After 1972, the political left went 
underground to avoid persecution by the Marcos regime.  The Communist Party of the 
Philippines (Maoist faction) brought many of the left-wing elements in the anti-fascist 
(anti-Marcos) struggle under an umbrella organization (united front) called the National 
Democratic Front that was established on 24 April 1973.173  CPP leaders envisioned the 
NDF as a political action agency that “…seeks to develop and coordinated [sic] all 
progressive classes, sectors and forces in the Filipino people's struggle to end the political 
rule of US [sic] imperialism and its local allies in the Philippines, and attain genuine 
national liberation and democracy.”174
The NDF-aligned front organizations were organized into various interest groups, 
e.g., workers, youth and students, church groups, farmers, women, professionals, artists, 
and urban poor (See Appendix A).  From the perspective of the NDF, it “…is the formal 
united front of the organizations of the basic forces of the revolution, comprising of the 
working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie.”175  NDF organizations and 
their members operated in a clandestine manner even though their political actions were 
manifested in above-ground “cause-oriented” political groups.  The CPP was ostensibly 
only a member of the NDF according to the latter’s table of organization.176  However, in 
practice the party cadres have control or influence on the key positions within the “united 
front” and its component organizations.  As a Marxist-Leninist party, the CPP believes in 
the primacy of a “vanguard party” in directing the course of a revolutionary struggle.  It 
was not uncommon to have policy differences between the CPP leaders and the party 
members in the United Front Commission (UFC) because the communist party had much 
 
173 “What is NDF [?]” National Democratic Front, from the internet: 
http://home.wanadoo.nl/ndf/about/index.html (accessed 02/12/05) 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 “What is the NDF?” from the internet:  http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndf.html (accessed 
12/11/04) 
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stricter ideological standards.177  The party members assigned to the UFC have to work 
with non-communist activists in the broader alliance of the NDF.  To attract these 
political activists into such an alliance, the NDF has to widen its political program 
beyond the CPP paradigm.  For example, the NDF ten-point program “…had been 
revised in 1977 to tone down the shrill Maoist syntax in the original document.”178  The 
NDF political program pledged to have a “democratic coalition government” that would 
“allow the free interplay of national and democratic forces during and after elections.”179  
There have been occasional tensions between the CPP and the NDF that arose from 
ideological differences: 
By 1984, party leaders had begun assuming what were called “dogmatic 
positions.”  The independence of the NDF had been “overstretched,” it 
was charged, and the Central Committee began to tighten its control.180
The assassination of opposition politician Benigno Aquino Jr. polarized the 
country and expanded the ranks of the opposition, including the NDF.  The rapid growth 
of the “united front” organization meant that there was less emphasis on ideology in the 
recruitment criteria for the NDF; this affected the communist party as well.181  The CPP 
ran into problems when its cadres became less tolerant of their non-communist allies who 
did  not  agree with the NDF program.  The “contradictions” became more obvious when  
 
177 According to a CPP member who assumed the leadership of the UFC in 1980, she was shocked by 
the rigidity of the recruitment rules in the NDF which limited the criteria to only the “basic masses,” i.e., 
lower-class industrial workers and poor and “lower-middle” peasants “…deemed reliable forces for the 
movement.”  The party cadres in Manila were afraid to broaden their contacts with middle and upper 
classes because of the CPP line that these classes are unreliable, viz., “the lower-class masses are the 
makers of history.”  Source:  Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution:  Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 147 
178 Ibid., 150 
179 Ibid.  See also William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1987), 221 
180 After the Benigno Aquino assassination in 1983 and the downturn in the economy, massive 
political demonstrations erupted.  The CPP argued that the “people’s war” had entered the advance sub-
stage of “strategic defensive” and would be entering the final stage called the “strategic offensive.”  NDF 
leaders like Zumel argued that the political struggle is just as important as the military component of the 
revolution.  Source:  Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 91 
181 Ibid, 91-92 
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prominent leftists proposed that unarmed political mobilization is the more relevant 
method in the anti-Marcos struggle.182  This ran against the CPP’s Maoist doctrine of the 
“people’s war” strategy.   
There were also disagreements within the CPP after the party Executive 
Committee committed the grave error of adopting a boycott policy towards the 1986 
presidential elections pitting Mrs. Corazon Aquino against Ferdinand Marcos.  The 
controversial result of the elections was one of the catalysts that triggered the People’s 
Power revolt in 1986.  Marcos was overthrown by massive demonstrations of common 
citizens who came out to protect and insulate the soldiers who rebelled against his 
regime.183  The military revolt encouraged the defection of other AFP units to the side of 
the opposition.  When the United States withdrew support from Marcos, he stepped down 
from power and went into exile in Hawaii.  As a result of the boycott policy, the CPP and 
some of its front organizations found themselves isolated from the rest of the opposition 
forces.  Even in one Manila suburb considered to be a communist stronghold, the CPP 
officials were shocked to discover that “70 percent of the membership of Party-led unions 
disobeyed the boycott order and voted.”184
Since the democratization started, there were changes in the Philippine laws that 
altered the definition of the CPP and its related organizations.  Then-president Fidel 
Ramos repealed the Anti-Subversion Law and legalized the status of the Communist 
Party.185  In spite of these changes, the CPP vowed to continue its armed struggle.186  
Jose Maria Sison chose to keep the front organizations of the NDF underground even 
 
182 Randolph David, a respected leftist UP sociology professor, was labeled by the Central Committee 
paper Ang Bayan as a “petty-bourgeois intellectual kibitzer” for making such a suggestion in his thesis 
paper.  Source:  Jones, 150 
183 Bryan Johnson, The Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the People Who Brought Down 
Marcos (New York:  The Free Press, 1987) 
184 Jones, 159 
185 “Ramos legalizes Philippine Communist Party,” 22 September 1992, United Press International, 
from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05) 
186 Ibid.  See also, Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal, “Arroyo regime proving that armed revolution is 




                                                
though they were no longer considered illegal.187  As a result the tactics, techniques and 
procedures of the “reaffirmist” faction of the CPP remained the same even after the 
creation of the democratic space. 
The various underground front groups advocated the political issues that were 
relevant to the sectors they represented.  For example, the “Revolutionary Council of 
Trade Unions,” which the NDF describes as an alliance of revolutionary trade unions, has 
members who operate within “above-ground” or legal trade unions.  According to 
Kessler, the “NDF began issuing a worker’s paper, Proletaryo, in September 1979, and at 
an organizing meeting in May 1980 at Manila’s Araneta Coliseum, the group founded the 
May First Movement (Kilusang Mayo Uno or KMU).”188  Kessler added that because the 
KMU and other front organizations were overt and their members were probably not all 
communist party affiliates, the NDF cannot always ensure control of these labor 
unions.189
Similarly, the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) members operate 
clandestinely within legal leftist student and youth organizations, e.g., the League of 
Filipino Students (LFS)190.  The advantage of this arrangement was that it enabled these 
above-ground front organizations to organize political discussions around issues that 
affect their main constituencies.  From that vantage point, these “cause-oriented” groups 
were able to link local matters to national issues, e.g., campus nationalism vs. American 
military presence.  The propaganda strategy included a “bait & switch” tactic that lured 
followers with campus issues (tuition-fee hikes, academic freedom and nationalism) and 
then linked them to the anti-U.S. agenda that is presented at the bigger student 
 
187 For example, Sison stated that “The KM has chosen to be in the underground in the Philippines in 
order to guard against the possibility that the imperialists and reactionaries might again try to wipe out 
legally existing patriotic and progressive organizations as in 1972.”  Source:  Jose Maria Sison, “Interview 
with Prof. Jose Maria Sison,” 4 June 2003, Interview by Freedom Siyam, from the internet:  
http://www.inps-sison.freewebspace.com/anakbayanseattleinterview.htm (accessed 02/11/05) 
188 Kessler, 90 
189 Ibid., 91 
190 The members of these “above-ground” organizations are not all CPP or NDF members.  Therefore, 
they are technically not communist organizations by strict definition.  Filipino security officials sometimes 
run into a faux pas with labeling issues and were often accused by the leftist groups with “red-baiting.”  
However, the political line espoused by these groups was undeniably the same as the CPP-NDF sans the 
“armed struggle” party line. 
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demonstrations.191  The local issues were sometimes the primary mobilizing tool to incite 
the university crowd and steer it to the political events outside the campuses, e.g., at the 
American Embassy.192  Similar tactics were used to attract participants from the labor 
unions, environmental groups, church associations, women’s movement, and others.   
Since the serious split in the CPP in 1992, the groups and individuals who left or 
were expelled from the communist party have formed their own groups and parties.     
The “rejectionists” camp was actually composed of at least seven separate groups.  
During an interview, former CPP member Nathan Gilbert Quimpo stated: 
The most positive consequence [of the split] has been the emergence of a 
more pluralist Left and there’s no more hegemony on the part of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines–National Democratic Front–New 
People’s Army (CPP–NDF–NPA). We have a Left which is now more 
plural.  Today, there are about seven main groupings within the Left 
including the CPP and the Partido Demokratiko–Sosyalista ng Pilipinas 
(PDSP), the mainstream social democratic party.  In between these two 
there are five other groups. If you include the Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipinas (PKP), there are eight. The PKP, the old pro–Moscow party, has 
not been that active and is very much weakened since the late 1980s.193
 The “rejectionists” groups have different strategies for achieving political power 
that is distinct from the CPP.  Some of these groups rejected the idea of a “people’s 
democratic republic” and the Maoist strategy of “people’s war.”194  In addition, most of 
them do not accept the Maoist “semi-feudal and semi-colonial” analysis of the Philippine 
                                                 
191 “In 1977, the League of Filipino Students (LFS) was formed with a three-part program: restore 
democracy on campus, end the imperialist control of education, and dismantle the U.S.-Marcos 
dictatorship.”  Source:  Kessler, 89.  The LFS started as a student alliance against the tuition fee increases.  
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society or world situation.195  Quimpo said that the “rejectionist” factions can be roughly 
divided into five camps which he described as follows: 
(1) Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa–Pilipinas (RPM–P) 
[Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines] – strategy similar 
to Vietnamese-style of revolution using a combined political-
military framework. 
(2) Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP) [Philippine Workers 
Party] – insurrectional type of strategy similar to the People Power 
revolts. 
(3) Marxist–Leninist Party of the Philippines (MLPP) – broke away 
from the CPP in 1997.  Considers itself the “genuine” reaffirmist 
of the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. 
(4) Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa–Mindanao (RPM–
Mindanao) [Revolutionary Workers Party – Mindanao] – used to 
be part of the RPM-P during its founding Congress in 1998.  Broke 
away from the RPM-P in 2000 because of differences related to the 
negotiations of the peace agreement with the President Estrada 
administration. 
(5) Akbayan [Citizens Action Party] – a “multi-tendency” party 
composed of several political blocs.  Two of the original blocs, 
Siglaya and the Movement for Popular Democracy, were from the 
“national democratic” movement (NDF-aligned) in the past.  The 
“popdems” or popular democrats had disbanded as a political 
tendency.  Only a section of the Siglaya stayed with Akbayan.  The 
other two political tendencies in Akbayan are not from the 
“national democratic” tradition.  These are the Bukluran sa 
Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG) – independent 
socialist group – and the Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas 
(from the social democratic tradition).196   
According to Nathan Quimpo, the PMP, RPM-P and the CPP remain focused on 
the seizure of state power while Akbayan leans more toward the neo-Gramscian concept 
of “counter-hegemony” by building power within civil society and among the people.197    
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The state of affairs in the Philippine left remains controversial.  In the CPP newspaper’s 7 
December 2004 issue, the International Department of the party labeled several groups in 
the “rejectionist” camp of being “counter-revolutionaries with links to international 
Trotskyites and Social Democrats.”198  UP Professor Walden Bello and Representative 
Loretta Ann Rosales, both leaders of the Akbayan, were concerned because their names 
appeared on the CPP “hit list.”199  The Akbayan leaders have reason to fear because the 
CPP-NPA was implicated in the assassination of several leftist leaders in the 
“rejectionist” camp.  The CPP-NPA admitted to assassinating Arturo Tabara, the national 
chairman of the RPM-P on 26 September 2004, accusing him of conniving with the 
military.200  Police investigators were also looking into the possible connections of the 
killing of Tabara with the assassinations of two former CPP-NPA leaders Romulo 
“Romy” Kintanar (killed in 2003) and Filemon “Popoy” Lagman (killed in 2001).201
Akbayan was a vocal critic of President Arroyo’s policy to allow American forces 
to participate in the Balikatan 03-1 exercises at Sulu in 2003.  It stated that the mere 
presence of U.S. troops was a “provocation.”202  Unlike the NDF-aligned organizations, 
Akbayan refrains from using hyper-nationalistic Maoist jargon.203  The CPP-NDF still 
use shrill ranting about the three “isms” (imperialism, bureaucratic-capitalism and 
feudalism).   
Groups like Akbayan focus on developing participatory democracy and not armed 
revolution.  Unlike the CPP, whose goal is to supplant the system of “cacique 
democracy”  with   a  “people’s  democratic  republic”  ruled  by  a  vanguard  party,  the  
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Akbayan seeks to transform the shortcomings of the existing political institutions to 
“deepen Philippine democracy.”204  The gist of Akbayan’s foreign policy 
weltanschauung is as follows, 
Our foreign policy should be anchored on effective negotiations for 
national interests, on building mutual respect in our relations with [the] 
United States and other advanced capitalist countries, on shared interests 
among Asian peoples and governments, on support for human rights and 
democratization. We are opposed to [former] Ramos administration plans 
to restore extra-territorial powers to the American military. Our ports and 
airports should be accessible to all friendly commercial and military traffic 
without special privileges to any country.205  
 From the above statement, the Akbayan does not totally rule out U.S. military 
access to ports and airport facilities.  However, it was critical of the “extra-territorial 
powers” that an agreement like the VFA represents.  The definition of the “friendly 
commercial and military traffic without special privileges” was also vague and may be 
subject to debate and interpretation as to who is “friendly.”  In contrast to the CPP and 
NDF perspective of globalization as “evil and bad,” the Akbayan Party views it as 
causing both problems and opportunities.206  
Akbayan legislator Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel was critical of the present American 
military deployment in Mindanao.  She stated, “Under the guise of cooperation and 
technical assistance, America is trampling on our national sovereignty. This is 
intervention. We must resist them.”207  Her remark was in response to the American 
ambassador’s earlier disclosure that seventy American intelligence and military experts 
were in Mindanao to assist with information gathering related to the American-Filipino 
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training exercises.208  The ambassador’s comment sparked tempers among nationalist 
groups because of concerns that the American “strategy experts” were spying on 
Filipinos.  Admiral Fargo, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, clarified that the 
American experts were sent to provide training and assistance to the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines and not to spy.209   
Although the political left in the Philippines is split because of major differences, 
the various factions of the “rejectionists” and the “reaffirmist” camps were vocal in 
unison when they expressed opposition to the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement 
(MLSA) in 2002.210  Party-list Bayan Muna (a legal “national democratic” organization), 
Akbayan, Sanlakas, Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya (KPD), Cordillera 
People’s Alliance and other organizations expressed their sentiments against the 
MLSA.211  About thirty-nine groups composed of national democrats, social democrats 
and popular democrats, religious and  academic groups, non-governmental organizations, 
and even some members of the old PKP (pro-Moscow communist party) joined forces to 
oppose the Balikatan 02-1 U.S.-R.P. military exercises in Zamboanga and Basilan in 
2002.212  These groups represented a small sampling of the organizations that belong to 
separate leftist camps.   
 
B. RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES POST-1986 
PEOPLE POWER REVOLT  
 
The Philippine democratic transition in 1986 was followed by several right-wing 
coup attempts against President Cory Aquino’s administration.  The tumultuous 1980s 
saw the rise of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) as a destabilizing force 
in the Philippine military.  After playing a role in the ouster of the Marcos regime, the 
politicized RAM retained its momentum by intervening in the politics of the country.  In                                                  
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conjunction with other right-wing groups like the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), 
and the Young Officers Union (YOU), the RAM staged its most serious coup attempt in 
December 1989, prompting President Aquino to seek the military intervention of the 
United States.  The American president ordered U.S. Air Force F-4C fighters stationed at 
Clark Air Base to conduct “persuasion flights” above Philippine military rebel bases to 
dissuade them from attacking government facilities and military bases loyal to the Cory 
Aquino government.  Prior to the American intervention, rebel planes bombed the 
constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame and a RAM helicopter machine-gunned loyal 
government troops at Camp Aguinaldo.213  Although, the U.S. Air Force planes did not 
fire at the military rebel forces, the RAM and their allies were more than annoyed by the 
American intervention.  The right-wing movement resented the American “meddling” in 
the Philippine internal affairs and joined the nationalist campaign to oust the U.S. 
military bases in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Like right-wing groups in Thailand (see Section B, Chapter II), the RAM was 
ideologically anti-communist and nationalistic in its own right.  The core group of RAM 
was composed of AFP officers from the Philippine Military Academy class of 1971.214  
Many of these officers were veterans of the counter-insurgency wars against the 
communists and Muslim secessionists in the 1970s and the 1980s.215  Historically, the 
AFP had a strong relationship with the United States armed forces, as evidenced by the 
significant role played by the U.S. Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and the 
U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the training of 
some units and officers in the AFP.   The JUSMAG had been supportive of the AFP 
education and training since the 1950s.216
The RAM/SFP/YOU published statements of opposition to the presence of the 
American military bases while the December 1989 coup was in progress.  Why did some 
officers  of  the  Philippine  military  suddenly  turn  against  the  United  States  in  1989?  
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According to Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., “...the ‘persuasion flights’ had sparked a current of 
anti-Americanism in the Philippine military never before seen in the history of the 
AFP.”217  
President Bush [Sr.] ordered F-4 Phantom jets to fly over the capital 
[Manila on] Dec. 1 after [Filipino] rebel planes bombed and strafed the 
presidential palace.  Philippine and foreign military experts generally 
agree that the coup could not have been quashed without the "persuasion" 
flights, which kept rebel planes from taking off.218
Pimentel added, “In March 1990, the Young Officers Union publicly denounced 
US [sic] domination in the Armed Forces [of the Philippines] and in Philippine society in 
general.”219  The YOU was a more radical element than the RAM because it had adopted 
an “anti-imperialist” line and even considered an alliance with the communists if the CPP 
will drop its Marxist-Leninist ideology.220  Members of the YOU were influenced by 
Nilo Tayag, a former communist cadre who started nationalist seminars in the military in 
the early 1980s.221  Tayag’s seminars on Filipino ideology or “Filipinism” were 
described as a “non-communist Left alternative to imperialism, fascism and 
communism.”222  The Young Officers Union was organized into cells of less than ten 
members, like the communist movement.223  The inner core of the YOU came from the 
Philippine Constabulary intelligence officers224 who had been monitoring the communist 
movement’s activities.  These military officers were impressed by the organizational 
savvy and ideological commitment of the communist cadres.  They recognized a need to 
fill the ideological vacuum in the rank and file of the AFP.  The YOU recruiters were 
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successful in forming secret political cells inside the Scout Ranger companies that 
participated in the 1989 coup attempt.225
As early as 1986, some members of the RAM showed signs of anti-American 
sentiment as a result of the belief or suspicion that the United States government may 
have tipped-off the intelligence service of President Marcos about the impending coup 
that triggered the People’s Power revolt.226  The anti-American sentiment in right-wing 
organizations could also be explained within the context of the nationalistic milieu of the 
1980s.  The radical left has verbally attacked the Philippine military as “running dogs of 
U.S. imperialism” since the Marcos era.  Under the prevailing circumstances, the 
nationalistic officers in the AFP who belong to the RAM and the YOU may have over 
compensated (ego defense mechanism) by adopting a more radical anti-American stance.  
Nationalism in the ranks of the AFP was often underrated by the critics on the left, even 
though significant numbers of Filipino soldiers fought and died in maintaining the 
territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic during the Mindanao insurgencies in the 
1970s to the present period.  
RAM and the other groups involved in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts reached 
a peace agreement with the government in 1995 and were granted unconditional 
amnesty.227   The RAM had since renamed itself the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang 
Makabayan (RAM) or Revolutionary Patriotic Alliance.  According to Brig. Gen. Victor 
Corpus (AFP Civil Relations Chief), the communist had been trying to form an alliance 
with rightist groups like the RAM to oust the present Macapagal-Arroyo government.228  
The right-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines do not have a significant political 
machine to organize anti-American protest mobilization.  However, they can adversely 
affect  the  economy with destabilizing coup attempts.  They could also align with groups  
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that have the organizational resources to employ an agitation-propaganda campaign, viz., 
the CPP-NDF is exploring methods of co-opting nationalistic elements in the Philippine 
military and police.229   
 
C. MORO NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES  
 
With the exception of the Abu Sayyaf, the former Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) members and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have not conducted 
any overt propaganda or physical attacks against American interests.  The MNLF was 
absorbed into the government and the AFP after the peace agreement in 1996.230  The 
Philippine government is currently negotiating the resumption of the peace talks with the 
MILF.  The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) met with the International Monitoring 
Team from Malaysia and members of the MILF to discuss ways to facilitate the peace 
process.231  USIP is an NGO formed by the U.S. Congress and supported by the U.S. 
State Department.  The United States offered a $30 million economic aid package that is 
contingent upon the conclusion of the peace agreement between the MILF and the 
Philippine government.232  The MILF does not have a clear position on the issue of 
future American military access or presence in the Philippines.   
Muslim mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s stoked the Moro nationalism and 
religious identities that led to the formation of the MNLF.  The MILF became a splinter 
faction of the MNLF in the early 1980s.  During the American invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001, the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao participated in demonstrations against the 
United States.   About 10,000 Muslims shouted “Jihad, jihad!” and “Death to America” 
during the street protests in Marawi City (515 miles south of Manila) to demonstrate 
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against the bombing of Afghanistan.233  “Murad Ibrahim, a vice chairman of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), warned the attacks on Afghanistan…would make more 
Filipino Moslems sympathetic with the Taliban and bin Laden.”234  According to Murad, 
the MILF had taken a “wait and see” attitude regarding the war in Afghanistan.  He 
warned, however, that the MILF is not in a position to stop any Muslim fanatic who 
might conduct retaliatory acts against American interests in the Philippines.235  Another 
report stated: 
In a Muslim-dominated region of the Philippines, about 5,000 protesters 
chanted ‘Death to America’ and ‘Long live Osama bin Laden’ as they 
burned American flags and a picture of Bush. Muslim leaders in the city of 
Marawi warned Americans in the region that they were not safe.236   
It is not clear whether the MNLF or the MILF were involved in organizing these 
demonstrations.  The Filipino Muslim (Moro) anti-war protests held in front of the U.S. 
Embassy in Manila in October 2001 appear to have been organized by “national 
democratic” leftist groups.237  The NDF is known to have created a Moro Revolutionary 
Organization (MRO) which it described as an “underground organization of the Moro 
people in Mindanao, southern Philippines.”238
 
D. LEFTIST NATIONALISM IN THAILAND 
 
After the coup of 1976 and the rightists’ attacks on the left-wing National Student 
Center of Thailand (NSCT) organized demonstrations at Thammasat University, no 
major organization or civil society group identified itself openly with the left.  The NSCT 
was severely weakened after many of its members fled to the countryside or abroad.  
 
233 “Thousands of Philippine Moslems rally against U.S. attacks,” 9 October 2001, Deutsche Presse- 
Agentur, from Lexis-Nexis database (02/26/05) 
234 “Thousands of Philippine Moslems rally against U.S. attacks”  
235 Ibid. 
236 Chris Fontaine, “Protests against U.S.-led attacks continue as allies pledge support,” 9 October 
2001, The Associated Press, from Lexis-Nexis database (12/13/04) 
237  “Protest actions against war of aggression and reaction continue in the Philippines,” October 2001, 
Ang Bayan (official newspaper of the CPP), 5, from the internet:  http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-
bin/archive/archive.pl (accessed 11/24/04) 
238 “What is the NDF?” from the internet:  http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndf.html (accessed 
12/11/04)  
55 
                                                
With its leaders in jail, the student organization splintered into smaller groups.239  The 
official death toll of the rightists attack against the student demonstration at Thammasat 
University on 6 October 1976 was placed at forty-one, and another 3,000 students were 
detained by the police and the military.240  Eighteen of the top leaders of the NSCT were 
charged with treason, lese-majeste, communist activities, and attempted murder.241  
Liberal democracy suffered a serious reversal in Thailand after the coup of 1976, and the 
rural communist movement incurred a short-term gain as a result of the influx of city 
students fleeing from right-wing vigilante groups and the government security forces.  
In addition to the legacies of the 1976 military crackdown, the left as an 
ideological force was shattered by the disillusionment of the students with their rough 
experience in the Communist Party of Thailand and the collapse of international 
communism after the Cold War.242  As a result, the left as a political movement was 
overtly absent in the May 1992 popular uprising that overthrew the military regime 
installed by the coup of 1991 - former 1970s student radicals participated as individuals 
in the people power revolt.243 According to Giles Ungpakorn, an avowed Marxist and a 
political science professor at Chulalongkorn University, the major forces that drove 
reform during the period after the 1992 revolt can be divided into two conflicting class 
factions: the “people faction” and the “liberal business faction.”244  He also suggested 
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that class struggle in Thailand took the form of “civil-society” (interest groups) 
competing for influence against the state, the role once played by the leftist parties like 
the Socialist Party, the Socialist United Front, and the New Force (Palang mai).245  If this 
was the case, it may explain why the opposition to American military forward presence in 
Thailand in 2001 took the form of influential lobby blocs within the Thai Rak Thai 
government and the opposition representatives in the parliament, and the seeming lack of 
identifiable left-wing groups protesting – a sharp contrast to the Philippine situation.246  
As democracy continues to mature in Thailand, the budding elements on the left may 
calibrate their activities according to the tolerance of the expanding democratic space.  
In 2003, the anti-U.S. demonstrations conducted by secular groups were planned 
mainly by academics (faculty members and student leaders) from major universities in 
Bangkok.  It was led by a newly formed umbrella group of twelve NGOs called the 
“People’s Globalisation Network for Peace” whose activists condemned the American 
war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.247  In addition these groups 
also opposed the bilateral agreement of the U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Area (FTA).  The 
protest planned for 17 October 2003 had a small number of estimated participants, mainly 
students and artists belonging to the Student Federation of Thailand and the Association 
of Artists for Peace.248  The Workers’ Democracy Group led by Giles Ungpakorn 
planned to join the peace march of the student activists.  The venue of the demonstration 
was set at the same route used by student activists in 1976 who protested against the 
American military bases in Thailand.249   The political Left in Thailand has the capacity 
to keep the anti-American agenda alive, but it currently does not have the mass following 
to mount large demonstrations such as those seen in the 1970s.  Political activists in  
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Thailand lamented on the difference of their government’s tolerance of protesters in 
comparison to the Philippines’ more lenient atmosphere.  Furthermore, Thai observers 
noted the vibrancy of civil society in the Philippines in sharp contrast to Thailand: 
The protest in the Philippines last week appeared to be more radical and 
involved a much larger number of protesters.  Some 7,000 students and 
other demonstrators took to the streets and burned US [sic] flags while 
trying to march on the Philippine House of Representatives…Protesters 
included some legislators who unfurled anti-war banners before walking 
out in protest during Bush’s speech.250The Philippine civil society 
movement seems to have earned state recognition from its long history of 
struggle against colonialism and, in recent times, dictatorship and 
corruption.251
E. MUSLIM POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN THAILAND AFTER 9/11 
 
The American military forward presence in Thailand remains controversial not 
only because of its past effects on civil-military relations.  President Bush’s declaration of 
war against terrorism after 11 September 2001 triggered a negative response from the 
Thai Muslims who perceived his proclamation as anti-Islamic.  Prime Minister Thaksin’s 
government was under extreme pressure during this period because of President Bush’s 
policy statement that “if you are not with us, then you are against us.”  Caught between a 
“rock and a hard place,” the Thai government’s dilemma became painfully obvious after 
Muslim groups from southern Thailand petitioned the prime minister to oppose the 
United States’ attack on Afghanistan. 
The Thai government and the public sensitivity to American military access 
during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) reflected their concern for the opinion 
of the Thai Muslims in the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, Pattani, Satun, 
Chang Mai, and Chang Rai.  Prior to the start of the OEF, eight Islamic groups sent a 
letter to Prime Minister Thaksin to express their opposition to the deployment of Thai 
troops into Afghanistan.  Similar concerns were voiced against allowing American 
military forces to use Thai military bases.  The Muslim groups were composed of 
moderate or mainstream Islamic NGOs like the Council of Muslim Thai Organization, 
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the Foundation for Islamic Centres of Thailand, Muslim Media Association, Muslim 
Youth of Thailand Association, Thai Muslim Students Association, Thai Pakistan 
Friendship Association, Muslim Lawyers Club and the Siam Muslim Club.252  The Thai 
government was careful not to alienate the Thai Muslims because it could fan the flames 
of Muslim insurgent groups like the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO).  
Even before receiving the letter from the Muslim NGOs, Prime Minister Thaksin 
appealed to the Islamic community to be wary of “People with ill intentions [who] are 
trying to stir this [Afghan war] up into a religious issue.”253   
Thailand’s Prime Minister was in a quandary after President Bush’s speech to the 
American Congress declared, “Either you are with us, or you’re with the terrorists.”254  
Thailand wanted to support the United States but at the same time to prevent the 
alienation of its Muslim minority.  As of 24 September 2001 “Thaksin has said Thailand 
will back America’s war on global terrorism, but the government has denied speculation 
that [the] U-Tapao Air base might be used as a staging area for US forces.”255  PM 
Thaksin’s Office Minister Thamarak Isarangura “ruled out the possibility that the United 
States would use Thailand as a base to launch retaliatory strikes on countries that harbour 
terrorists”.256  The Defense Minister and other military officials likewise issued vague 
references to Thailand’s policy regarding American military forward presence at U-tapao, 
sometimes alluding to the annual COBRA GOLD combined exercises.   
The Thai Muslims’ concern with American forward presence in Thailand during 
the war in Afghanistan in 2001 took the form of influential voices in the parliament such 
as Surin Pitsuwan, a former foreign minister who is also a Muslim.  He supported the 
idea of allowing the United States to use Utapao as a logistics base, but he also said the 
government must be sensitive to the feelings of the Muslims in the country.257  Surin 
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Pitsuwan was also critical of the Thai government for not being candid about the nature 
of the American military forward presence during that period.  He alleged that the 
government lied to the Muslim leader Chularajmontri Sawas Sumalayasak that the U.S. 
aircraft used the base at Utapao for “routine” refueling stops and not for warplanes 
headed to attack Afghanistan.258  Thai Muslims in the southern provinces opposed the 
American bombing of Afghanistan and urged a nationwide boycott of products made in 
the United States.259
Muslim groups in the four provinces in the south were able to mobilize large anti-
war demonstrations during this period.  In Yala alone, about 10,000 participated in a rally 
denouncing the U.S. military action and called for a boycott of American goods.260  The 
provincial Muslim committees in southern Thailand sent representatives to Prime 
Minister Thaksin to clarify the nature of the American military use of the U-Tapao naval 
airbases.261  Of the 50,000 Muslims in the northern province of Chiang Mai, about 1,000 
to 3,000 were expected to join protests similar to those organized in the south.262  The 
aftermath of 9/11 and the United States declaration of war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
had energized the Muslim constituencies in both the southern and the northern provinces 
of Thailand.  Thai Muslims’ reaction to the American military presence in their country 
took the form of peaceful protests, rallies, and boycott of American-made goods.  The 
political mobilization of Muslims in the southern provinces may have sparked the revival 
of the symbols and idioms of religious fundamentalism that added a new twist to the 
Malay ethnic nationalism.   The recent Islamization of the Muslim identity, the policy 
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failures of the current Thai administration and the dismal quality of conflict management 
had exacerbated the simmering insurgency in recent years since 2001.263
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IV. RATIONALE OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS OF 
GROUPS OPPOSED TO U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 
While it cannot be discounted that opposition groups have genuine concerns about 
the negative impact of American military presence on security and sovereignty of the 
Philippines and Thailand, some of these groups also have a self-interest that could be 
jeopardized by this presence.  For example, the military assistance and counter-terrorist 
training received by the AFP from the United States to fight the Al Qaeda linked Abu 
Sayyaf could also be used to stem the CPP-NPA revolutionary armed struggle.  The CPP 
and the NPA’s concern became more pronounced after the U.S. State Department 
included their group in the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in 2002.  
 
A. LEFTIST-NATIONALIST RATIONALE IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Perhaps the loss of sovereignty is the foremost issue in the minds of the leftist 
opposition to American military forward presence.  The arguments of the left are often 
couched in historical terms, as previously discussed in Chapter II.  A critic of the Visiting 
Forces Agreement (VFA) described it as “…a neo-colonial document that makes a 
mockery of Philippine sovereignty.”264  It is noteworthy that spokespersons of 
nationalistic groups would sometimes arrogate the position of the Filipino majority as 
compatible with their point of view, for example: 
This US-imposed agreement was opposed and continues to be opposed by 
the vast majority of the Filipino people.265
The Filipino people reject the VFA because of its one-sided, unequal, 
unjust, onerous and deceptive provisions.  It has been described by the 
very influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) as 
"an agreement between a master and a lackey."266  
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These claims are discounted by surveys conducted by the Social Weather Stations 
(SWS) between 2 June and 16 June 1999.  The results being a majority 55 percent of 
Filipinos agreed with the Philippine Senate approval of the Visiting Forces 
Agreement.267  “The nationwide SWS survey found 23 percent disagreement with the 
Senate approval of VFA, and 18 percent undecided.”268  Furthermore, a plurality of 43 
percent believe that the Philippines has the final say on the length of stay and the number 
of American forces that can visit the country.269  Only one-fourth (23 percent) do not 
believe the Philippines has this discretion.270  Majority of those surveyed (59 percent) 
believe that the United States military will aid the Philippines in the event of an armed 
conflict with China over the Spratlys.271   
The Philippine public perception differed from the American policy reiterating 
Washington’s neutrality towards competing claims in the Spratly disputes.  As a matter of 
policy, the United States has rejected the periodic Philippine overtures to link its Spratly 
claims with the Article Five of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.272  According 
to Shannon Tow, the multilateral and bilateral exercises conducted by the United States 
with allies in the region had strengthened the credibility of the United States as a 
dominant maritime power in Southeast Asia.273  This could account for the positive 
responses to the surveys conducted in the Philippines.   
The “silent majority” of public opinion spoke through these surveys, although the 
Filipino critics made a louder noise in both domestic and international protest events.  It 
is important to keep this in perspective when conducting public diplomacy in future 
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A second rationale is the constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of 
foreign military forces and bases without a treaty approved by the Philippine Senate.  
Several center-left politicians filed a petition in the Philippine Supreme Court to have the 
VFA declared “unconstitutional.”274  Since the expiration of the Military Bases 
Agreement in 1991, there has been no new treaty that would allow the return of American 
forces, according to their argument.  The petition cited Section XVIII, Article 25 of the 
Philippine Constitution to support their case.275  Among other things, the petition also 
stated that the VFA is void because it allows the violation of the constitution’s provision 
against nuclear weapons (Article II, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution).  The American 
military’s policy is to “neither confirm nor deny” the presence of nuclear weapons aboard 
U.S. military aircraft or naval vessels.276  
The June 1999 survey also found that a plurality of 42 percent of Filipinos 
believe that the U.S. will voluntarily follow the Philippine constitutional 
ban on nuclear arms. Over one-fourth (28 percent) do not believe that the 
U.S. will comply with the ban, and the rest are undecided.277
This issue of neither confirming nor denying nuclear capability of American 
forces remains controversial because it conflicts with the provision against nuclear 
weapons in the Philippine Constitution.  The incompatibility of these two policies is 
likely to be exploited by the critics of the VFA.  
Third, leftist critics denounced the surrender of Philippine jurisdiction over 
incidents involving American military personnel participating in the combined military 
exercises.  In the same petition submitted to the Philippine Supreme Court, the petitioners 
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questioned the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement related to the criminal 
jurisdiction issue.  Philippine Supreme Court judges ruled 11-3 and issued a statement, 
“It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in 
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of 
the powers vested in him by the Constitution ...”278
The VFA allows the US [sic] total jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
US personnel while in the Philippines. It compels the Philippines to 
“waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction (over all offenses 
committed by US troops) upon request by the US except in cases of 
particular importance to the Philippines. The Philippines also agreed to 
waive claims on damages to the environment, destructions caused by the 
activities of the VFA.279
This portion of the Visiting Forces Agreement is likely to revive the motif of the 
“unequal treaties” argument.  A motor vehicle accident in Zamboanga allegedly 
involving four drunken American soldiers during the Bayanihan 2003 military exercises 
raised attention to this issue.280
A fourth rationale, Filipino leftists opposed the U.S. military presence because it 
could potentially involve the Philippines in American conflicts with third parties or 
neighboring states.  During the Cold War, Filipino critics argued that the presence of 
American military bases in the Philippine could be a magnet for a Soviet nuclear strike or 
counter-strike.  This fear was not totally unfounded because a declassified 1958 U.S. 
State Department memo cited the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that 
China and its Soviet ally may retaliate against the 7th Fleet Headquarters (then located at 
Subic Bay Naval Base) if the United States use nuclear weapons in a limited war in the 
Far East.281  Current discussions include statements that the Philippines is likely to be 
targeted by more terrorist attacks because of the United States designation as a “Major 
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Non-NATO Ally.”  Other scenarios cited are the potential involvement of the Philippines 
in the event of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, or a war in 
the Korean Peninsula.282
The past American support given to President Marcos’ authoritarian regime 
germinated another reason for opposing the U.S. military bases.  This rationale was one 
of the dominant themes in the mid-late 1980s and may have been the catalyst of the 
nationalistic milieu during that period.  According to Gregor and Aganon: 
The United States was understood to have created the “Marcos 
dictatorship” or at least to have perpetuated it through direct and indirect 
support.  As early as 1975, Lorenzo Tanada and Jose Diokno arranged to 
have published, under the imprimatur of the Civil Liberties Union of the 
Philippines, an account of human rights violations that attributed the very 
existence of the Marcos government to Washington’s efforts “to protect 
the privileged position of foreign and domestic capital and the interest of 
the U.S. government.”283   
This issue no longer holds sway, probably because of the generation change and 
the different role played by the United States in preventing the right-wing movement 
from taking power in the RAM’s 1989 coup attempt.  A rightist military government 
could have re-imposed authoritarian rule fifteen years ago.  Even the political left is 
acutely aware of this, although it would not acknowledge the positive role of the U.S. 
military in preventing a rightist take-over. 
After the American intervention to save the Aquino administration from the 
military coup, right-wing groups began to actively support the anti-bases protest that was 
pioneered by the left.  “In her weekly radio program May 6 [1990], President Corazon 
Aquino warned that military dissidents who have staged several unsuccessful coups 
against her government may soon join forces with communist rebels.”284  She made this 
comment after seeing a widely circulated photograph showing a well-known dissident 
military officer was raising his fist (Marxist style) in a protest and shouting “revolution.”  
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B. RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST REASONING IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Unlike the leftist groups, the rationales related to the jurisdiction issue over 
American personnel and the past American support of the Marcos authoritarian regime 
was not enunciated by right-wing groups.  However, rightist elements - especially the 
YOU - voiced similar concerns as the leftist groups with regards to the sovereignty issue.  
Less than a year after the most dangerous right-wing coup attempt against the Corazon 
Aquino government, the Young Officers’ Union and its allied organizations in a 
previously unknown Democratic Front for Filipinism (DFF) issued a statement serving 
“Notice of Termination of the R.P.-U.S. Military Agreement” on 1 September 1990.  It 
stated, “The continued existence of foreign military bases or facilities in the Philippines 
violates Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity, and an impediment to the full 
exercise of the sovereign Filipino people’s complete freedom.”285  The right-wing 
movement was miffed at the U.S. military intervention that thwarted their coup.  If the 
1989 coup d’état had succeeded, it could have reversed the democratization and ended 
the nascent democracy.  The frustration resulting from the failure of the 1989 coup added 
to the right-wing movement’s list of complaints against the presence of the American 
military bases.   The RAM criticized the presence of the U.S. bases; in contrast, the YOU 
demanded their closure and removal.  
As in the case of the leftist groups, the right-wing nationalist movement also cited 
the provision, of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the constitution, against nuclear weapons as 
the justification for the closure of the U.S. military bases in 1991.286  The DFF also stated 
one of their objectives in a manifesto as “in fulfillment of the sovereign Filipino people’s 
commitment in making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality287
Like the left, right-wing groups also fear the potential involvement of the 
Philippines in American conflicts with third parties or neighboring states.  The Young 
Officers’ Union and the DFF wanted the Philippines to pursue non-alignment and 
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neutrality as a foreign policy.  It criticized the U.S. bases in 1990 as not primarily for the 
defense of the Philippines, but as forward defense bases against American adversaries, 
namely, the People’s Republic of China and the former Soviet Union.288  The views of 
former members of right-wing organizations like the RAM would change after the PRC 
take-over of the Philippine claimed Mischief Reef (Spratlys) in 1995.  By 2000, some 
members of RAM including its former leader Gringo Honasan (a Philippine Senator by 
that time) supported the renewal of ties with the United States through the Visiting Forces 
Agreement.  Honasan voted in the Senate in favor of the ratification of the VFA.289  
Honasan stated, “We have no choice. We cannot afford to remain neutral. Prudent 
alliances are our only option."290  Nationalistic idealism gave way to realpolitik as a 
result of the recognition that the United States can play the role of balancer against an 
aggressive China. 
 
C. MUSLIM OPINION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Rationales (1) to (6) and (8) do not apply to Muslims in the Philippines.  Filipino 
Muslims were sensitive to the American Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) because it 
was perceived as anti-Islamic.  The response of Muslims in Mindanao to the GWOT was 
mixed at best.  Initially, the pronouncement of the American government immediately 
after 9/11 was perceived differently in Muslim countries, including Muslim areas in 
Mindanao.  Poor choices of words like “Islamic terrorism” cast a wide net that included 
everyone who believes in the tenets of the Muslim faith.  Furthermore, the new visa and 
immigration restrictions applied to Muslim countries further exacerbated these 
perceptions.291  The wars on Afghanistan and Iraq have been the focus of anti-American 
agitators in Mindanao.  Protest issues now include the expansion of the U.S.-R.P. 
Balikatan exercises to other areas in Mindanao.  The MILF claimed “…that more than 
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11,000 held rallies in North Cotabato accusing the US [sic] of orchestrating wars on the 
island that resulted in the death of thousands and destroying billions of pesos worth of 
properties.”292  Militant civil society groups in Cotabato also blamed the United States 
for “underwriting” former President Marcos’ war in Mindanao "that resulted in 50,000 
killed, (displacement of) two million refugees, 200,000 houses destroyed, 535 mosques 
burned, and 200 schools demolished."293  Although the participants of these protests were 
mainly Muslims, there is a distinct possibility that NDF groups may be involved in the 
political mobilization and agitation-propaganda to spin the issues. 
 Muslim leaders who supported the American exercises did so because they 
generated business for local traders and small enterprises in other areas where the U.S. 
military had been in the past, e.g., Zamboanga City.  The city council at General Santos 
City voted 100 percent in favor the military exercises and stated that it is within the scope 
of the Visiting Forces Agreement signed by both countries.294   Business enterprises in 
the city of General Santos experienced a boom in the early 1990s as a result of a program 
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.295  This was not related to the 
VFA or the Balikatan military exercises.  However, the positive results of other 
American supported programs certainly contributed to the acceptance of the U.S. military 
presence in those areas.   
 
D. LEFTIST-NATIONALIST REASONING IN THAILAND 
 
The leftist rationale of “loss of sovereignty” does not carry as much weight as it 
used to be in the 1970s (see Chapter II).  It occasionally surfaces when American forces 
in large numbers appear at major Thai military bases as, for example, during the recent 
tsunami relief operations conducted out of Utapao naval airbase.  Although the current 
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discourse may not come from leftist sources, the rationale reflects similarities to the 
arguments of the NSCT in the 70s.  For example, Siri-anya an editorial columnist at the 
Bangkok Phuchatkan (a business daily published in Thai) stated, “...the United States has 
used the Thailand's U-Taphao military base and moved troops and some equipment there 
on the pretext that the base serves as the regional disaster relief center.”296  Siri-anya 
continued, “America has succeeded in its designs for the base.   It is up to patriots and 
academics to answer if Thailand has lost pieces of its territory and part of its national 
sovereignty and independence.”297
Interestingly enough, Thai right-wing groups in the 1970s articulated the 
sovereignty issue to justify their support for the American military presence.  For the 
rightist movement, the presence of the American forces in Thailand served as a bulwark 
against the external threat of communism that could have overturned Thailand’s 
sovereignty.  The fall of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to the communist in 1975 was 
followed by the American military withdrawal from Thailand that began in March 
1976.298  The U.S. military drawdown at a time when the “dominoes” where falling in 
Indochina did not augur well for the Thai conservative elite and its allies in the right-
wing movement.  The resulting panic set-off the rightists’ attacks at Thammasat 
University in October 1976.   
 The return of democracy to Thailand strengthened the authority of civilian rule 
over the military.  Unlike in the past when the incumbent governments were dominated 
by authoritarian military figures, the politics of today involve the process of electoral 
democracy and not coups.  It would be difficult for any opposition group to use the 
rationale of the “negative effects on civil-military relations” to argue against American 
military presence as a potential contributing factor to the degradation of civilian rule and 
democracy.  If anything is to be learned from history, the most acute phase of anti-
American sentiments in both Thailand and the Philippines was during the period of 
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democratic transition after an authoritarian regime that were underwritten by the United 
States collapsed.  These downfalls were preceded or followed by serious economic crises, 
e.g., the recession in Thailand from the ripple effect of the Arab oil embargo.  The 
combination of newly found freedoms and rising expectations frustrated by the slow rate 
of economic improvement after the transition to democracy may have heightened the 
feelings of discontent after 1973.299  
The arguments against granting access to logistics facilities to U.S. forces during 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM cited the parallels of Thai 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict at the urging of the United States.  Bases in Thailand 
were used in the past as staging areas for strike missions to bomb Hanoi.300  Similarly, 
some Thais expressed concern that bases like Utapao might be used for a similar purpose 
against Afghanistan in 2001 (see Muslim sentiments below).   
 
E. MUSLIM SENTIMENTS IN THAILAND 
 
The backdrop of Thai Muslim perceptions of the GWOT has similarities with its 
counterparts in the Philippines (see previous Section C in this chapter).  In addition, one 
of the major reasons why Muslims in Thailand opposed the presence of American forces 
in their country in 2001 was the potential use of bases there to launch direct strikes in 
Afghanistan.  Muslims in southern Thailand also expressed their opposition to sending 
Thai soldiers to support that war. “Eight Islamic groups tell PM [Thaksin] they are 
against sending troops or allowing the United States to use Thai military bases.”301
The Thai government was concerned with the escalation of the Muslim 
insurgency that could result from the American forward deployments perceived to be 
related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 
(OIF).  Prior to the start of OEF, the United States requested the support of key allies 
including Thailand in providing bases or facilities to support the war in Afghanistan.  The 
 
299 See James C. Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27 
(1962): 5-18 
300 See Glasser, The Secret Vietnam War 
301 “LETTER TO THAKSIN: Muslim NGOs oppose aid for US operations,” 27 September 2001, The 
Nation (Bangkok), from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05) 
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Thai government response was ambivalent because of its concern for the sentiments of 
the Muslim Thais in the southern provinces.  There was a latent, but simmering Muslim 
insurgency in the south that could be inflamed if the Thai government and military 
consents to the American request for access to logistics facilities in Thailand.  The 
simultaneous and contradictory statements of Thai government and military officials 
were a symptom of this ambivalence.302
Dr. Panitan Wattanayakorn, a lecturer at the Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty 
of Political Science, said that, “Its [Thai government] confusing and conflicting 
statements concerning the situation were understandable because it had to balance 
security obligations and domestic politics.”303  (Underline added for emphasis).  The 
government of Thailand was literally between a “rock and a hard place” because it cannot 
ignore its security relationship with the United States, but at the same time have to give 
consideration to the sentiments of its minority Muslim population in the south – who 
could easily be agitated by radical Islamic elements.  The rash of terrorist attacks in 
southern Thailand in 2002 was a sign that Islamic radicalism was on the rise since the 
9/11 attacks and the American response with a Global War on Terrorism. 
 
                                                 
302 Sources showing the conflicting statements of Thai civilian and military officials:  “US ‘doesn’t 
need bases,”   24 September 2001, The Nation (Bangkok), from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1; 
See “US Military Strikes:  Asean to be consulted on Thai airbases,” 22 September 2001, The Nation 
(Bangkok),   from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1; Panya Tewsangwan and Marissa Chimprabha, 
“US cleared to make use of U-Tapao,” 10 October 2001, The Nation (Bangkok), from The Nation website 
(accessed 2/25/04); See also “U-Tapao ‘not used for US strikes,’”  12 October 2001, The Nation 
(Bangkok),  The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04); See article of Marissa Chimprabha, “Use of U-Tapao 
Base:  Government lied – Surin,”  18 October 2001, The Nation (Bangkok), from The Nation website 
(accessed 2/25/04), 1
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
From the evidence gleaned from the Thai and Philippine histories, there have 
been conflicting sources of nationalism and their respective definitions of national 
interests that reflect the fluidity of the domestic politics especially during periods of 
economic crises and the political transitions into democratic regimes. The most salient 
anti-American sentiments were expressed during the early phase of democratic transition 
and consolidation.  Harsh criticisms of U.S. military forward presence were contained by 
authoritarian rulers who benefited from the largesse of American economic and military 
aid.  A return to democracy saw the resurgence of freedoms to articulate all kinds of 
grievances, including the criticisms against the American military presence.   
These sentiments are comprehensible in a context in which American national 
security interests prevailed over those of its democratic ideals during a dangerous period 
of the Cold War.  The United States succored the authoritarian regimes in order to gain 
access to forward military bases to confront the more insidious threat of communism.  To 
put it in the simplest terms, American policies in Thailand and the Philippines during this 
period chose the lesser of two evils.  Those policies reflect the pragmatism of realpolitik 
espoused by its distinguished proponents in the U.S. State Department like George F. 
Kennan: 
We will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming.  And 
our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate 
national objectives.  We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford 
today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction.  We should cease to 
talk about vague, and for the Far East, unreal objectives, such as human 
rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization.  We should 
recognize that our influence in the Pacific and the Far Eastern World is 
absolutely vital to our security.304
The current American policy enunciated by the National Security Strategy of the 
United States (2002) is the complete opposite of the Cold War realism aptly articulated 
 
304 George Kennan, “Review of Current Trends: U.S. Foreign Policy,” 24 February 1948, excerpt in 
the Containment : documents on American policy and strategy, 1945-1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John 
Lewis Gaddis (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1978), 226-228
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by George Kennan.  The authors of the NSS called for the “expansion of open societies 
and democracies” and the “promotion of global economic growth through free markets 
and trade.”305  As a consequence, American actions to achieve military forward presence 
will be gauged according to the professed values of U.S. national policy makers.  The 
wanton use of economic and political leverage associated with the past may be distasteful 
to both the American public and the domestic public opinion in Thailand and the 
Philippines.  The presence of democratic political institutions and processes in these 
countries introduces new challenges for American military planners and strategists 
because of intrinsic checks and balances that allow the articulation of the conflicting 
voices from various interest groups.  In sharp contrast, the pro-American authoritarian 
regimes of the past had a small circle of decision makers.   
The negative experience with the preceding American presence had damaged the 
“trust culture” in Thailand and the Philippines with respect to United States intentions 
related to access to base facilities.  “Trust culture” is defined by Piotr Sztompka, a 
prominent sociologist, as “…a system of rules – norms and values – regulating granting 
trust and meeting, returning, and reciprocating trust; in short, rules about trust and 
trustworthiness.”306  The United States has recovered some of that trust, as evidenced by 
the major headway achieved by the bilateral relationship with both Thailand and the 
Philippines.  These were manifest in the support given by both countries to the American 
war on terrorism.   
Although not surprising, one of the major findings of this research is the 
revelation in detail of the groups that were and are working to damage or degrade the 
“trust culture” in these countries with regards to their relationship with the United States.  
The more radical elements of the opposition want to rekindle the image of America as an 
“imperialist power.”  The unilateral action in Iraq did not help to cast off that impression.   
This thesis has been able to identify the different sources and rationales of the 
opposition to the American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines.  
The rationales of the opposition groups can be summarized as follows:  
 
 
305 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1 
306 Piotr Sztompka, Trust:  A Sociological Theory (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
99 
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(1) Loss of sovereignty. 
 
(2) Constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of foreign military forces 
and bases. 
 
(3) Negative effects on civil-military relations.  
 
(4) Jurisdiction issues over incidents involving American personnel.  
 
(5) Potential involvement in American conflicts with third parties or 
neighboring states. 
 
(6) Past American support of authoritarian or military regimes. 
 
(7) Sensitivity of Muslim minorities to the American Global War on 
Terrorism that is perceived as anti-Islamic. 
 
(8) Government concern for the escalation of the Thai Muslim insurgency that 
may result from American forward deployments perceived to be related to 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  
  
 As previously mentioned in Chapter II, III and IV; Philippine and Thai groups and 
individuals cited reasons like defense against the threats of communist neighbors, and 
international terrorism, to support and justify the American military presence.  In 
addition, the passage of the Visiting Forces Agreement in the Philippines Congress in 
1999 was partly because of the perception that the United States serves as a balancer 
against China - the aftermath of the Mischief Reef incident in 1995.  Other reasons in 
support of U.S. military presence mentioned the American assistance to improve the 
internal defenses against communist insurgencies and a right-wing coup attempt - as in 
the case of the Philippines in 1989.  A Thai academic highlighted, in Chapter IV, the 
importance of balancing security obligations with domestic political considerations as a 
rationale why the Thai government may have accepted American military forward 
presence in 2001.  Members of the military in both countries underlined the value of the 
assistance and training received from the United States as a result of the combined 
military exercises.  Filipino Muslims in Mindanao who supported the American military 
presence cited the economic benefits corollary to the past Balikatan exercises.  
Furthermore, the creation of jobs and the economic development in areas of Mindanao 
due to programs initiated by other American agencies like the U.S. Agency for 
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International Development may have laid the groundwork for a more positive reception 
of the combined U.S.-R.P. military exercises. 
 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAILAND, THE 
PHILIPPINES AND THE REGION  
 
American military presence in Thailand and the Philippines will remain 
controversial, more so with the latter country.  For this reason, the first “pure” RAND 
basing strategy listed in Chapter I (overseas main operating bases or MOBs) is not 
recommended for these two countries.  The second and third “pure” basing strategy is the 
more likely scenario in the Southeast Asia region.  To wit: identify one or more ‘reliable’ 
allies in the region and rely on them for future cooperation; and proliferation of security 
agreements to increase the number of potential allies in any given contingency.307
For these reasons, the United States has to explore different approaches to 
enhance the second and third RAND “pure” basing strategies and support them with a 
robust public diplomacy308 to restore the “trust culture” and mitigate the effects of the 
agents of “mistrust.”  The following recommendations are in order: 
(1)  Because the specificity of military basing in the case of a contingent scenario 
will only have a deterrent effect if it is declared, the United States must be ready to open 
discussions with allies during the early phases of a crisis escalation in the region to 
achieve guaranteed access to facilities, not only for logistics assets but also for combat 
forces.  This has to be negotiated through normal political channels (with executive 
approval and legislative concurrence) with the groundwork prepared by both the State 
and the Defense departments.  In essence, the U.S. government has to request a treaty to 
satisfy the existing constitutional restrictions – in the case of the Philippines.  The 
preparatory groundwork should include an aggressive public diplomacy with special 
emphasis on the potential impact of the crisis on regional security and balance of power.  
                                                 
307 Shlapak and others, eds, A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force, 92-93 
308 See footnote 27 
77 
Emphasis on normal political channels meant that the domestic actors (members 
of the congress or parliament) in each country have to evaluate the situation and come to 
their own conclusions.  Public diplomacy has to be geared to support the American 
position by presenting them as a part of a much broader regional security interest.  The 
role of the State Department is crucial in elevating the issues at the multilateral forum in 
the region (the ASEAN Regional Forum) and the United Nations Security Council.  This 
would bolster the credibility of American public diplomacy in both Thailand and the 
Philippines and negate charges of “U.S. imperialism” coming from the more radical 
opposition.   
The existence of democratic space in both Thailand and the Philippines allows for 
the rational discussion of the issues involving all parties including the center-left and 
center-right representatives.  The far left in the Philippines relies on nationalistic 
emotions and symbolism akin to fascist tactics used in Germany in the 1930s.  It would 
be easier to rebuff and isolate the most radical opposition when the danger of a regional 
crisis becomes obvious even to leftist members of the legislatures. 
If all else fails, the United States should consider terminating the ACSA or MLSA 
at a minimum or even the mutual defense treaties if the refusal to accept U.S. military 
presence causes grave harm to American national interests.  This would placate all the 
allegations about “protection rackets” and “U.S. imperialism” in the context of a major 
regional crisis in Asia.  There is evidence that the domestic public opinion in both 
countries recognized the value of reciprocity ingrained by the positive aspects of the 
relationship and role of the United States as a balancer in the region.  
(2)  On the counter-terrorism front, the involvement of American forces in direct 
combat or their presence during training exercises in the immediate areas of the 
insurgencies in both Thailand and the Philippines is not recommended.  The 
shortcomings of the Thai government in handling the southern problem had already 
damaged the “trust culture” between Muslim and Buddhist Thais.  Introducing a foreign 
element like the U.S. Special Forces will only further damage the “trust culture” 
considering the anti-American sentiments already prevalent in that region of Thailand.  
This is a problem that is internal to Thailand and can only be mitigated if the Thais 
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themselves ask for interlocutors acceptable to and trusted by Thai Muslims, i.e., 
intermediaries from Muslim countries like Malaysia or Indonesia.   
The same is true with the current peace process between the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).  
At the present time, Brunei and Malaysian troops serve as the buffer between the GRP 
military and the MILF rebels.309  American interest may be better served by non-military 
assistance to the peace process as envisioned by the economic assistance package and the 
role of NGOs like the United States Institute of Peace.   
In the case of both Thailand and the Philippines, the respective governments have 
to address the root causes of the insurgencies and terrorism.  Their independence in 
addressing those issues is a step towards strengthening the domestic “trust culture.”  
Philippine government and military officials are under attack by the CPP/NDF/NPA as 
“puppets of U.S. imperialism.”  American diplomats and officials can seek the support of 
non-traditional, potential allies in domestic politics – center-left politicians – to 
implement programs addressing the “basic needs” issues in the Philippine Congress.  
These programs had been the grist of the U.S. Agency for International Development in 
Mindanao – as mentioned in the previous chapter.  In addition, the American military and 
non-governmental organizations can assist a GRP-initiated program like “health care 
reform.”  Political activists from the NDF attack the mournful state of the health care 
system without providing a solid program alternative to solve it – a tactic of revolutionary 
warfare to destroy the state’s credibility and the “trust culture.”  
The U.S. military have years of experience in training medics and hospital 
corpsmen (and women) to handle basic medical needs at the platoon level.  If the 
Philippine or Thai governments initiate a “community health program” to address the 
issues of preventive medical care at the grass-roots level, the U.S. military can 
incorporate its expertise to assist in the formation of “institutes of community health” 
 
309 “OIC members Malaysia, Brunei and Libya have troops deployed on the island to monitor a 
ceasefire between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to help them find a political 
settlement to the decades-old separatist rebellion.”  Source:  Darwin T. Wee, “OIC assured talks with 
Muslim rebels on track despite clashes,” 11 February 2005, BusinessWorld (Philippines), from the Lexis-
Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05) 
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similar to the “Naval School of Health Sciences.”310  This form of assistance is different 
from previous Medical Civic Action Programs or MedCAPs because it would develop 
indigenous capacities and not dependency on outside support or foreign medical 
technology.  The Peace Corps and Medecins Sans Frontières have similar programs.  The 
drive for health care reform towards a “national health care system” is compatible with 
the ideology of left.  Therefore, a counter-terrorist program that addresses basic 
community health needs will most likely be supported by center-left politicians in the 
Philippine Congress or even by the populist, but conservative Thai Rak Thai government 
in Thailand.  The legislation of impartiality laws and the inculcation of neutrality as a part 
of values and norms of medical ethics in both countries will shield medical professionals 
and their assistants from attacks by extremists from both the left and the right.  There 
were incidents in the past where doctors were assassinated by right-wing extremists or 
suspected security forces personnel because they treated NPA guerrillas with injuries.  
Impartiality laws and the ethics of neutrality should equally apply to military physicians 
and those serving in the Muslim insurgency zones in both Thailand and the Philippines.    
American support for such a community health program will enhance the “trust 
culture” and give acceptability to reforms that would otherwise be rejected by the most 
conservative members of the parliament or the congress in these countries.   The 
precedent set by the American military role during the tsunami relief efforts had set the 
tone for similar MOOTW activities under the aegis of counter-terrorism.  The community 
health project in the Philippines and Thailand is a viable program for U.S.-PRC counter-
terrorist cooperation because it is humanitarian in nature.   
Military-to-military cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army is allowed by 
Public Law 106-65 Section 1201 if it involves humanitarian type of exercises (see 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000).311   The People’s Republic of 
 
310 The Naval School of Health Sciences in San Diego, California have a program to train 
“Independent-Duty Corpsman,” from the internet:  http://nshssd.med.navy.mil/idc/index.htm (accessed 
03/06/05) 
311 “Title XII: Matters Relating to Other Nations - Subtitle A: Matters Relating to the People's 
Republic of China - Prohibits the Secretary from authorizing any military-to-military exchange or contact 
with the People's Liberation Army of the Republic of China if such exchange or contact would create a 
national security risk. Makes such prohibition inapplicable to search and rescue or humanitarian exercises.”  
Source:  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, from the internet:  
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN01059:@@@D&summ2=m&  (accessed 3/14/05).  See 
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China has a desire to be recognized as a responsible regional power in Asia.  This was 
evidenced by the humanitarian assistance China extended to the Southeast Asia tsunami 
disaster areas.  American engagement through this project could reinforce China’s 
positive behavior and soften her belligerent attitude towards the United States at a time 
when the tensions across the Taiwan Straits are mounting.  This is a project that could 
enhance the regional “trust culture” not only in Southeast Asia but also between the PRC 
and the United States.  A combined humanitarian project is less vulnerable to criticisms 
from the domestic opposition in both Thailand and the Philippines.  
(3)  In consonance with the second and third RAND “pure” basing strategies, the 
United States should seek a proliferation of security agreements and alliances in the 
region that would include non-traditional partners like Indonesia and Malaysia.  There 
were recent discussions of the renewal of the U.S. military training programs for 
Indonesia (cancelled 13 years ago) during the recent visit of Indonesian Defense Minister 
Juwono Sudarsono.312  The renewal of military ties with Indonesia should serve as a 
prelude to a deeper security relationship that would engender the “trust culture” among 
American friends in the region.  A step in this direction would also help improve the 
chances of resolving the differences between Indonesia and the U.S. traditional ally, 
Australia.  Both had strained relations since the 1999 Australian military intervention in 
East Timor.313  A full restoration of military relationship with Indonesia would allow the 
TNI forces to join the combined military exercises of traditional American allies in the 
 
also Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” 7 December 2004, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, from the internet:  
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RS21995.pdf .  Kan discusses the current counter-terrorism cooperation 
between the PRC and the United States.  Shirley Kan’s report did not mention any humanitarian missions 
or counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S. military and the PLA at the present time.  “Military-to-
Military Contacts. While there has been no counter-terrorism cooperation with the PLA, the Pentagon has 
cautiously resumed military-to-military contacts with China, limited after the EP-3 crisis and subject to 
review by Secretary Rumsfeld. For the first time under the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and the PLA 
again held Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) on December 9, 2002. There were visits by China’s Defense 
Minister, General Cao Gangchuan, in October 2003 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Richard Myers, in January 2004. The two militaries held another DCT round in February 2004. Congress 
has oversight of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65), which limited contacts 
with the PLA to prevent its ‘inappropriate exposure’ to operational areas.” Source: Kan, 6 
312 Jane Perlez, “Indonesia Welcomes U.S. Plan to Resume Training Its Military,” 1 March 2005, The 
New York Times, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05) 
313 “Australia cut links with Kopassus after the Indonesian military-backed violence in East Timor in 
1999 left 1400 people dead.”  Source:  Sian Powell, “U.S. Army to resume ties with Indonesia,” 28 
February 2005, The Australian, from Lexis-Nexis database (03/06/05) 
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region.  The improvement of U.S.-Indonesian relationship could enhance the cooperation 
of other regional players (Malaysia) in supporting the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative (RMSI) that was proposed by Admiral Fargo in 2004.  RMSI was envisioned to 
improve the cooperation of the littoral countries (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) in 
protecting the Malacca Straits from potential terrorist attacks, piracy and drug trafficking.  
The proposition was opposed by Malaysia and Indonesia because the United States would 
send its naval special forces to patrol the straits.  This was perceived as a potential 
violation of the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the littoral waters of the concerned 
states.  Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak said: 
It is a sad fact that many of those who use the strait take it for granted. 
There are even those who forget that littoral states, each of them sovereign 
nations in their own right, have the ultimate say over the protection and 
preservation of the strait…Any assumption that its users have absolute 
freedom to utilize it including for military purposes reflect a lack of 
respect for the rights of littoral states and a misunderstanding of 
international law.314
Formalizing the security alliances with Indonesia and Malaysia will not only 
enhance their cooperation with the RMSI, but also open the possibility of other options to 
Thailand and the Philippines in the event access to these places was denied.   
(4)  In addition to the U.S. military, American law enforcement agencies (FBI, 
DEA, etc.) and civilian institutions (think-tanks) can expand their relationships with 
counterparts in Thailand and the Philippines to deal with the problems of piracy, drug 
trafficking and terrorism.  The reduction of military footprint in some areas could 
attenuate the sensitivities to American military presence.   
(5)  The proliferation of security agreements such as the Mutual Logistics Support 
Agreement (MLSA) has to be transparent.  Because transparency reinforces the “trust 
culture” that is necessary for democracy to thrive in places like Thailand and the 
Philippines.   It  would  be  a  pity  to  sacrifice democracy in one of these countries in the  
 
314 “U.S. says it has no ulterior motive for Malacca Strait,” 11 October 2004, Japan Economic 
Newswire,  from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05) 
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hopes of saving another one in Asia or elsewhere.  As Piotr Sztompka once said, “It is not 
only that democracy engenders trust, but also, once in place, the culture of trust helps 





315 Sztompka, 146 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
(NDF) ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS316
(1) Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-MLMZT), re-established along 
explicitly Maoist lines in 1968, provides the leadership in the Philippine 
revolution.  
(2) New People's Army (NPA), special mass organization of the CPP and principal 
armed force of the NDF.  
(3) Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions (RCTU), an alliance of revolutionary 
trade unions.  
(4) Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM), National Association of 
Peasants, including farm workers.  
(5) Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Patriotic Youth, and association of the youth and 
students.  
(6) Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA), Patriotic 
Movement of New Women, underground organization of women.  
(7) Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF), an alliance of various indigenous 
peoples in the Cordillera region of Northern Luzon.  
(8) Christians for National Liberation (CNL), an underground organization of church 
and lay people.  
(9) Katipunang ng mga Gurong Makabayan (KAGUMA), Association of Patriotic 
Teachers, including educational workers. 
(10) Katipunan ng mga Samahang Manggagawa (KASAMA), Federation of Labor 
Organizations, also includes the semi-proletariat and the urban poor.  
(11) Artista at Manunulat ng Sambayanan (ARMAS), Artists and Writers for the 
People, a league of cultural activists, includes those in film, TV, radio.  
(12) Makabayang Kawaning Pilipino (MKP), underground organization of 
government employees.  
(13) Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan (MSP), Patriotic Health Association, for 
doctors, nurses, medical students, community health workers, etc.  
(14) Liga ng Agham para sa Bayan (LAB), League of Scientists for the people.  
(15) Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO), underground organization of the Moro 
people in Mindanao, southern Philippines.  
(16) Revolutionary Organization of Lumads, revolutionary organization of indigenous 
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APPENDIX B: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) 
TWELVE-POINT [POLITICAL] PROGRAM317
(1) Unite the people for the overthrow of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system 
through a people's war and for the completion of the national democratic 
revolution.  
(2) Establish a people's democratic republic and a democratic coalition government.  
(3) Build the people's revolutionary army and the people's defense system.  
(4) Uphold and promote the people's democratic rights.  
(5) Terminate all unequal relations with the United States and other foreign entities.  
(6) Implement genuine agrarian reform, promote agricultural cooperation, raise rural 
production and employment through the modernization of agriculture and rural 
industrialization and ensure agricultural sustainability.  
(7) Break the combined dominance of the U.S. and other imperialists, big compradors 
and landlords over the economy. Carry out national industrialization and build an 
independent and self-reliant economy.  
(8) Adopt a comprehensive and progressive social policy.  
(9) Promote a national, scientific and pro-people culture.  
(10) Uphold the rights to self-determination and democracy of the Moro people, 
Cordillera peoples and other national minorities or indigenous peoples.  
(11) Advance the revolutionary emancipation of women in all spheres.  
(12) Adopt an active, independent and peaceful foreign policy.  
 
 
317  This version of the NDF political program was approved during the NDF First National Conference of 
July 1994.  Source:  “NDF Twelve-Point Program” from the internet: 
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